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A UNIFYING THEORY OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Title VII outlaws sex discrimination in employment, directing 
that an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment must not be provided in a sexually discriminatory 
manner. 1 Title VII encompasses various styles of intentional sex 
discrimination, including disparate treatment discrimination and 
sexual harassment. While Title VII does not distinguish disparate 
treatment and sexual harassment, courts historically have. 2 
Disparate treatment generally concerns discrete employment 
decisions made because of sex or policies that disadvantage an 
employee or group of employees based on their sex. The 
employment decisions or judgments at issue in these cases are 
usually those that businesses must make in the normal course of 
business, such as hiring, firing, and promotion. Conversely, sexual 
harassment cases have historically concerned personal sexual 
gratification, inequality, and dominance. These cases have involved 
treatment of employees, usually women, as sexual objects or sexual 
unequals whose function was not merely to be good workers but to 
be entertainment or enjoyment for other employees.3 When such 
• The author thanks the University ofMissouri Law School Foundation for its generous 
support of this Article. Additional thanks are extended to Professors Christopher Guthrie and 
Ann McGinley for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. The author also thanks his 
research assistants, William Fritzlen and Elizabeth Meyer. Lastly, the author thanks his 
wife Paula, daughter, and family for their constant support. 
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1999) (listing unlawful employment practices). I will 
generally refer to "terms, conditions and privileges of employment" simply as "terms of 
employment" or "employment terms." 
2 See Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court 
Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 726 (1999) [hereinafter 
White, Nothing Special] ("[F]ederaljudges confronting sexual harassment cases have treated 
these claims as something special or different from run of the mill discrimination claims.''). 
3 See L. Camille Hebert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 
565, 571 (1995) [hereinafter Hebert, Sexual Harassment]. The author opines: 
Leering, touching a woman in a sexual way, and making sexually 
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treatment resulted in the discriminatory provision of an employee's 
terms of employment, Title VII was breached. 
Historically, the different visions of disparate treatment and 
sexual harassment created separate theories of liability under Title 
VII and distinct contexts in which to explore the different causes of 
action. The conduct that supported sexual harassment claims and 
the conduct that supported disparate treatment claims were 
considered sufficiently different to require separate structures of 
proof for each claim. Traditionally, disparate treatment claims have 
focused on whether the employment decision about which the 
plaintiff complained was motivated by the plaintiffs sex or gender. 4 
The causation was direct. Conversely, sexual harassment cases 
have confronted two distinct questions. The first question is 
whether the conduct at issue was of a sexual nature, motivated by 
sexual desire, or both. The second question is whether the conduct 
caused the discriminatory provision of terms of employment. 
Affirmative answers to both inquiries led to the conclusion that the 
discriminatory provision of terms was caused by sex and, therefore, 
Title VII liability existed. The causation was indirect in that the 
harm was deemed caused by gender because the conduct, and thus 
the harm, was motivated by sexual desire, was of a sexual nature, 
or both. 
The United States Supreme Court's recent clarification of the 
conduct that can support a sexual harassment claim has altered the 
doctrinal basis for differentiating disparate treatment and sexual 
harassment claims. 5 Now the conduct underlying a sexual 
harassment claim need merely be harassment undertaken because 
of the plaintiffs sex or gender rather than harassment based on 
I d. 
explicit comments are all fairly questionable activities in most 
settings other than an intimate one. In the workplace, such conduct 
not only shows lack of respect for women workers but also suggests 
that they are present in the workplace merely to satisfy the sexual 
desires of men. 
• See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (determining that sex 
stereotyping may have caused or motivated decision to bold plaintift's partnership bid). 
5 The Court bas also eliminated the historical doctrinal basis for separating quid pro quo 
and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims by noting that the same conduct 
may support either type of claim. See infra Part m. 
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sexual desire or of a sexual nature. 6 By expanding the range of 
conduct that may support a sexual harassment claim in this way, 
the Court has indicated that a sexual harassment claim may lie 
whenever gender-related harassment, rather than sex-motivated 
harassment, affects an employee's terms of employment. This 
makes many sexual harassment claims practically indistinguishable 
from disparate treatment claims. Arguably, the two types of claims 
are no longer doctrinally distinct; sexual harassment is just like 
disparate treatment. This simplification of sex discrimination law 
is not surprising; it tracks the Court's desire, evident in St. Mary's 
Honor Center v. Hicks,7 to simplify Title VII.8 
The Court has also recast the distinction between the two types 
of sexual harassment claims-quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment. Now the distinction between these claims is not in the 
type of conduct that an employee faces but only in the type of 
damage that the employee suffers.9 If the employee suffers actual 
job detriment, a quid pro quo claim may lie; if the employee does not 
suffer actual job detriment, a hostile work environment claim may 
lie. Thus, the prior presumed doctrinal distinction between hostile 
work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment no longer 
exists. When this development is combined with the recognition 
that any-gender-based harassment may yield sex discrimination, a 
unified and simplified theory of sex discrimination emerges: Title 
VII is implicated whenever gender-based conduct actually or 
constructively harms an employee's terms of employment. This 
unified theory is unremarkable in that it merely restates Title VII. 
However, it represents a dramatic departure in that it allows Title 
VII to expand to its appropriate limit, as defined by its mission, to 
promote a truly equal workplace. 
While commentators have noted the Court's simplification of 
sexual harassment and disparate treatment jurisprudence, they 
6 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) ("[H]arassing 
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on 
the basis of sex."). 
7 509 u.s. 502 (1993). 
1 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New 
Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1996) (tracking Supreme Court's attempt 
to simplify definition of discrimination in racial disparate treatment cases). 
1 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
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have failed to note just how momentous the simplification is.10 This 
Article seeks to rectify this oversight. The Court's simplified theory 
of sex discrimination prepares the way for an expansion of sex 
discrimination claims. The unified theory must integrate the legal 
theories supporting sexual harassment and disparate treatment on 
their own terms.11 Sexual harassment theory recognizes that Title 
VII may be violated either when a tangible job detriment has 
occurred or when a hostile work environment results from 
harassment. Disparate treatment theory recognizes that any 
gender-motivated conduct may yield sex discrimination. Thus, 
hostile work environment and disparate treatment theory should 
combine to produce a new cause of action that makes actionable any 
non-harassing, gender-related conduct that creates a hostile work 
environment. Not surprisingly, other somewhat less momentous 
implications ought to flow from the Court's simplified theory of sex 
discrimination as well. Each expands Title VII's potential reach and 
will be discussed below. In summation, the Court's simplification 
of sex discrimination means that conduct actionable under Title VII 
may be significantly broader than previously thought. 
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part I consists of a 
hypothetical situation which will be referenced throughout the 
Article to illustrate sex discrimination jurisprudence. Part II 
describes the Supreme Court's disparate treatment jurisprudence. 
10 Some commentators view the changes as important, but not extremely so. See, e.g., 
White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 730 (noting that Supreme Court has merged analysis 
of sexual harassment law with other claims of intentional discrimination); Steven L. Willborn, 
Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the Fate of Exceptionalism in Sexual 
Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 678 (1999) (noting that Oncale "brings 
discrimination back into sexual discrimination law"). 
11 See White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 753 (arguing that ideas underlying 
disparate treatment should inform sexual harassment and vice-versa); see also Paul J. Gudel, 
Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 95 (1991) (suggesting that sexual 
harassment law's treatment of intent should be imported into disparate treatmentlaw); Mary 
Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court's Rhetoric and 
its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 80 (1998) 
C'A more sensible, workable response would be application of concepts underlying Court's 
harassment jurisprudence to all disparate treatment cases."); Vicki Schultz, 
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1714 (1998) (noting hostile work 
environment's historical antecedents in disparate treatment discrimination); Miranda Oshige, 
Note, What's Sex Got To Do With It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565, 567 (1995) (proposing that hostile 
work environment harassment be treated like disparate treatment). 
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Part III describes the Court's restructuring of sexual harassment 
jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV examines the elimination of the 
distinction between sexual harassment and disparate treatment and 
its implications, including the new hostile work environment 
disparate treatment claim. 
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM 
Susan Jones began working at PW, Inc. ten years ago. PW is an 
accounting firm. During her first several years at PW, Susan's co-
workers told her that women at PW were expected to conform to an 
antiquated image of femininity. Susan's female co-workers made 
clear that were she a superb accountant who conformed to the 
partnership's image of a female partner, she would probably become 
a partner at PW. However, they also told her of former female 
employees who would not adjust to PW's idiosyncratic workplace. 
Each of these employees either quit before her partnership vote or 
quit after her partnership bid was delayed indefinitely. Those 
employees whose partnership bids were delayed experienced 
difficulty finding work after leaving PW, as prospective employers 
wondered why they would leave PW seemingly on the verge of 
becoming partners. 
During Susan's tenure at PW, many of her male co-workers and 
partners commented to her on her attire ("not stylish enough for a 
woman"), her personal style ("too confrontational and masculine"), 
and her language ("too coarse for a woman"). AB Susan neared 
partnership, she spoke to several partners to ascertain her prospects 
of becoming a partner. Each told her that, if she wanted to become 
a partner, she needed to act more ladylike, dress more ladylike, and 
be more deferential. Most of the partners Susan spoke to noted that 
while they would support her candidacy, other partners likely would 
not unless she projected a more feminine and deferential demeanor. 
Not surprisingly, Susan was upset that her partnership appeared 
contingent on altering her personality and behavior. Susan, 
however, did not change her dress, manner, or appearance. Rather, 
after becoming a very capable accountant, Susan quit PW to join 
another firm before her partnership vote. She simply did not believe 
that she would become a partner at PW. Unfortunately, Susan's pay 
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at her new firm was lower than it had been at PW, and she would 
not be eligible for partnership until three years after she would have 
been eligible at PW. 
III. DISPARATE TREATMENT SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Title VII is a hybrid civil rights/labor statute that outlaws sex 
discrimination that results in the discriminatory provision of 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. It 
reads, in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to-fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's ... 
sex .... 12 
Title VII covers all aspects of the employment relationship.13 It 
applies to pre-employment conduct, conduct occurring during 
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999). 
13 See Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (intimating broad reading of 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U .8. 69, 75 
(1984) (noting that terms, conditions and privileges of employment are not limited to 
incidents of employment found in employment contract, but rather that they may arise from 
treatment generally afforded to employees in course of employment); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that" 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' 
. . . is an expansive concept"); Jensvold v. Shalala, 925 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D. Md. 1996), 
affd, 141 F.3d 1158 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that while "[n}ot every aspect of an employment 
relationship constitutes a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment, .•. the phrase 'terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment' includes any benefit that was part and parcel of the 
employment''); Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count As Terms, Conditions or 
Privileges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643, 654 (1996) (noting broad 
language in Title VII regarding what employer practices it covers). But see Reno v. 
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 977 F. Supp. 812, 824-25 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (suggesting that 
employer's refusal to allow employee to attend training session did not amount to change in 
terms or conditions of employment); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 
EMORY L.J. 1121, 1153 (1998) [hereinafter White, De Minimis Discrimination] (noting that 
"terms, conditions and privileges" has been read by some courts to include only "materially 
adverse employer action"). 
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employment, and post-employment retaliatory conduct.14 
Disparate treatment discrimination is the easiest form of sex 
discrimination to recognize.15 Its essence is that an employee is 
intentionally treated differently with respect to terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment than his or her opposite-gendered co-
worker because of the employee's sex.16 In Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 17 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc./8 and Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 19 the Supreme Court described disparate 
treatment claims, making clear that policies and actions resulting 
in differential treatment of men and women with respect to 
employment can lead to Title VII liability. 
In Phillips, plaintiff Ida Phillips challenged Martin Marietta's 
policy of declining to accept "job applications from women with pre-
school-age children" at the same time it "employed men with pre-
14 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (holding that former employees are 
covered by§ 704(a), Title VII's retaliation provision); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 
139, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) C'Post-employment actions by an employer can constitute 
dilcrimination under Title VII if they hurt a plaintiffs employment prospects."); Veprinsky 
v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e believe that post-termination acts 
of retaliation that have a nexus to employment are actionable under Title VII .... "); Landon 
v. Northwest Airlines, 72 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that post-termination 
retaliatory acts may be actionable when certain conditions are met); Von Zuckerstein v. 
Argonne Nat'l Lab., 984 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that refusal to rehire might 
amount to actionable retaliation). 
15 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977} 
(noting that disparate treatment "is the most easily understood type of discrimination"). 
Many forms of sex discrimination exist, including disparate treatment, disparate impact, and 
sexual harassment. Disparate impact discrimination is nonintentional discrimination that 
occurs when an employment policy unevenly burdens different races, genders, or groups of 
employees based on protected classifications. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
434 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact as viable theory under Title VII). 
16 To assert a o:ause of action, Title VII merely requires that the employee's sex be a 
motivating factor for the conduct at issue. See 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(m) (1999) ("[A]n unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that ... sex 
..• was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice."); see also Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th 
Cir. 1999) ("So long as the plaintiff demonstrates ... that he would not have been treated in 
the same way had he been a woman, he has proven sex discrimination. The most direct route 
•.. is via proof that men and women were treated differently in the workplace."); Willborn, 
supra note 10, at 693 ("If sex is a motivating factor, then the discrimination element [of a 
Title VII case] is met.j. 
17 400 u.s. 542 (1971). 
18 499 u.s. 187 (1991). 
II 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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school-age children."20 Although the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Florida21 and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit22 both ruled that Martin Marietta was 
entitled to summary judgment, the Supreme Court decided that 
Martin Marietta's policy amounted to sex discrimination. The 
Court's finding was based on the fact that Martin Marietta treated 
men with pre-school-age children differently than women with pre-
school-age children. 23 While noting that Martin Marietta might 
have sufficient justification for the discriminatory policy to avoid 
Title VII liability-a suggestion that Justice Thurgood Marshall 
forcefully challenged24-the Court recognized that the differential 
treatment of female workers because they are female is sex 
discrimination that may lead to Title VII liability.25 
In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 26 at issue was the employer's 
different treatment of fertile women and fertile men. Johnson 
Controls's determination that exposure to elevated levels oflead on 
its factory floor could heighten the incidence of birth defects in 
children born to women who worked on the factory floor led to a 
policy restricting fertile women, but not fertile men, from working 
in certain well-paying factory floor jobs. The policy distinguished 
employees based on their sex even though evidence suggested that 
elevated lead levels harmed male reproduction as well.27 Although 
20 Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543. 
21 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 1968 WL 140 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 1968). 
22 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969). 
23 Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. Martin Marietta's policy can be viewed more accurately as 
one that is different for women with pre·school·age children than for everyone else in the 
workplace, including men with pre·school·age children. Nonetheless, it is easiest to isolate 
the policy's discriminatory impact if women with pre·school·age children are compared to men 
with pre·school·age children. 
24 See id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that Congress sought to eliminate 
limitations on women's employment opportunities based on stereotypes and "ancient canards 
about the proper role of women"). 
25 Id. at 544. 
26 499 u.s. 187 (1991). 
~ Although the Court did not clarify whether the evidence indicated that the harm to 
male reproduction was of the same type as the harm to female reproduction, the Court 
appeared influenced by Johnson Controls's lack of concern regarding male reproductive 
ability. The Court noted: "Despite evidence in the record about the debilitating effect oflead 
exposure on the male reproductive system, Johnson Controls is concerned only with the 
harms that may befall the unborn offspring of its female employees." Id. at 198. 
Arguably, Johnson Controls focused on the harm to the fetus, rather than on the 
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Johnson Controls's rule was ostensibly designed to protect putative 
fetuses from exposure to dangerous levels of lead in a mother's 
bloodstream, it also disqualified fertile women from higher-paying 
jobs that fertile men could hold. The policy also protected men who 
worked or wanted to work in factory floor jobs from competition 
from fertile women. The discriminatory bias of Johnson Controls's 
rule was clear. The employees excluded from factory floor jobs were 
exclusively women, and they were therefore ineligible for those 
relatively lucrative jobs. 28 The Court invalidated Johnson Controls's 
policy because it amounted to sex discrimination that was not 
statutorily excused.29 
While Martin Marietta and Johnson Controls concerned groups 
of women who were victims of explicit discriminatory rules or 
policies, Title VII's prohibition on disparate treatment 
discrimination also applies to situations in which particular 
employees are held to different standards of conduct because of their 
gender. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,30 the Supreme Court 
recounted Ann Hopkins's attempt to become a partner at Price 
Waterhouse, one of the country's most prestigious accounting 
firms. 31 Hopkins successfully completed her work tasks and was, 
according to the district court, a highly productive manager with the 
most successful record of bringing substantial business to Price 
Waterhouse of all managers who were forwarded for partnership the 
same year as Hopkins. Price Waterhouse, however, proffered 
Hopkins's interpersonal skills as its justification for declining to 
make her a partner.32 
policy's burden on female employees. Nonetheless, because only women can become 
pregnant, only women suffered a direct negative effect from the policy. Of course, Congress 
has deemed pregnancy discrimination sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1999) 
("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of 
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions •... "); Johnson 
Controls, 499 U.S. at 198·99 (noting that Pregnancy Discrimination Act includes pregnancy 
discrimination as sex discrimination). 
28 AJJ the Court noted: "The bias in Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but 
not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health 
for a particular job." Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197. 
29 Id. at206. 
30 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
31 Ann Hopkins tells her story in ANN BRANIGAR HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: MAKING 
PARTNER THE HARD WAY (1996). 
32 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35 (discussing partners' appraisal of Ann 
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In accordance with the trial court's findings, the Supreme Court 
determined that sex-based biases, along with concerns about 
Hopkins's interpersonal skills, may have affected the partnership 
decision. While some partners did mention Hopkins's job-related 
interpersonal skills in their evaluations, others criticized Hopkins's 
use of profanity and some ofher ostensibly "masculine" personality 
traits to forestall her elevation to partner.33 Apparently, some 
partners wanted Hopkins to act more "femininely'' (as defined by the 
predominantly male partnership) before she was made a partner.34 
That this was the partnership's desire was not lost on the partner 
tasked with telling Hopkins why her partnership was placed on 
hold. He told Hopkins that "in order to improve her chances for 
partnership ... Hopkins should 'walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.' "35 The Court determined that a 
requirement that a woman act in a certain manner in order to 
procure a partnership she would have obtained based on 
performance alone were she a man constituted disparate treatment 
discrimination under Title VII. 36 On remand, Hopkins was made a 
partner.37 
Hopkins's interpersonal skills). 
33 See id. at 235-37 (noting partners' comments concerning Ann Hopkins's supposedly 
masculine characteristics). Specifically, the Court noted: 
The [district court] judge went on to decide, however, that some of 
the partners' remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an 
impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women, and 
that Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance on such 
comments. He held that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully 
discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by consciously 
giving credence and effect to partners' comments that resulted from 
sex stereotyping. 
Id. at 236-37. 
a. Id. at 235. At least one commentator has suggested that regardless of the standard 
of femininity that women are held to, it is an inappropriately male standard. See CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 71-72 (1987) 
{hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED] (suggesting that sex discrimination law 
requires that women conform to male standard for men or to male standard for women, and 
that it is unclear that either standard is appropriate). 
36 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
88 Id. at 258. Price Waterhouse disputed that Hopkins would have been made partner 
were she a man, claiming that her non-gender-based interpersonal skills alone were sufficient 
to place her candidacy on hold. Id. at 236, 252. 
37 Price Waterhouse's claim that its decision would have been the same had Hopkins been 
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These three cases are merely examples of the Supreme Court's 
disparate treatment sex discrimination jurisprudence. An 
employment decision motivated by an employee's sex or gender that 
harms the employee's terms of employment constitutes actionable 
sex discrimination.38 At core, Title VII outlaws treating similarly 
situated employees differently because of their gender. By 
definition, disparate treatment is differential treatment. Thus, 
while arguments regarding whether any two employees or any two 
groups of employees are similarly situated will always exist, once it 
is determined that a woman and a man-or a group of women and 
a group of men-are similarly situated, they must be treated 
similarly.39 Hence, fertile female and male employees had to be 
treated similarly in Johnson Controls;40 women and men with 
school-age children had to be treated similarly in Phillips; and 
worthy female and male partner candidates had to be treated 
similarly in Price Waterhouse. 
In each case mentioned above, had the women involved been 
treated the same as their male co-workers, they would have enjoyed 
the possibility of better and more lucrative employment. That their 
employment options were restricted by discrimination triggered 
Title VII applicability. Absent discrimination, Ida Phillips would 
have had the opportunity to compete for a job at Martin Marietta; 
fertile female employees at Johnson Controls would have been able 
a man was eventually rejected. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C.), 
a[fd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
31 Of course, whether the discrimination is statutorily excused under Title VII is a 
different question. Justification for discriminatory treatment depends on the narrow bona 
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense. In Johnson Controls, the key issue was 
whether sex was a BFOQ for the jobs at issue. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 
200·01 (1991). BFOQ defenses only arise, however, once discriminatory treatment is 
demonstrated or cc•nceded. 
39 See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) C'An 
employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against 'because of his or her sex if, 'but-for' 
the employee's sex, he or she would not have been the victim of the discrimination."); 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 195-96 (1979) 
[hereinafter MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN] (suggesting that determining whether treatment 
would have occurred if plaintiff were male is key inquiry in determining if sex discrimination 
occurred). 
~0 Interestingly, one of the plaintiffs in Johnson Controls was a man who wanted to start 
a family but could not transfer from his factory floor job without suffering job detriment. 
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192. 
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to compete for the higher-paying factory floor jobs; and Ann Hopkins 
would have been made a Price Waterhouse partner. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, if Title VII prohibits anything, it 
prohibits providing different job opportunities and compensation to 
employees and potential employees because of sex. 
That each of the women in these cases suffered an overt and 
obvious job detriment or denial of a job opportunity made their cases 
easy to recognize as disparate treatment cases. In other cases, 
however, courts disagree about how serious the job detriment must 
be to be cognizable. While the Supreme Court noted in Hishon v. 
King & Spaldingu that Title VII covers any benefit that the 
employer provides to its employees,42 whether Title VII covers 
literally every benefit that could be considered a term, condition, or 
privilege of employment remains unclear. Professor Rebecca 
Hanner White analyzed the problems surrounding this issue in her 
article, De Minimis Discrimination. 43 Professor White noted that 
some courts limit disparate treatment claims to those situations in 
which an actual employment decision or materially adverse 
employer action has occurred.44 Other courts do not require that 
differential treatment yield a discriminatory employment action but 
do set a threshold of harm below which disparate treatment claims 
will not be cognizable. 45 
41 467 u.s. 69 (1984). 
42 Id. at 74-75. 
43 Supra note 13; see also Beiner, supra note 13, at 656·63 (discussing what counts as a 
term, condition or privilege of employment); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1714·16. 
44 See White, De Minimis Discrimination, supra note 13, at 1136-42 (discussing circuit 
split concerning requirement of"ultimate employment decision"). 
45 See id. at 1135 ("While the courts disagree on how high a threshold of harm is needed, 
most agree that such a threshold does exist."). For example, in Crady v. Liberty National 
Bank, 993 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1993), the plaintiff was transferred from a "branch manager 
position to a collections officerpositionLJ" id. at 135-36, but with the same salary. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the transfer was insufficient 
to constitute an actionable job detriment, noting that "a materially adverse change in the 
terms and conditions of employment must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or 
an alteration of job responsibilities." I d. at 136. While Crady was brought under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) rather than Title VII, its analysis is nonetheless 
applicable to the Title VII context. Title VII and the ADEA share many core concepts. See 
id. at 134-35 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a Title VII case, 
regarding ADEA prima facie case and accompanying shifting burdens). 
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While what constitutes a term or benefit of employment may be 
construed broadly by many courts, this broad construction occurs in 
the context of tangible job benefits. How terms of employment will 
be construed outside of that context is unclear because disparate 
treatment claims are rarely interpreted outside of the context of 
actual job detriment. 46 While Title VII is not limited to remedying 
economic harm47 it is not clear how fully non-economic harms will 
be remedied in the context of disparate treatment discrimination. 
This uncertainty would likely eliminate any possibility of recovery 
for our hypothetical plaintiff, Susan Jones. 
The expectations Susan Jones faced at PW are very similar to 
those Ann Hopkins faced at Price Waterhouse. Both were expected 
to be a certain type of woman, rather than merely a good worker. 
After her partnership was delayed, Hopkins was told by a partner 
that she should be more feminine. Similarly, Jones was told by 
partners and associates that she should be more ladylike so that she 
might become a partner.48 The Price Waterhouse Court indicated 
that requiring employees to conform to sex stereotypes may 
constitute sex discrimination.49 Under the reigning view of 
disparate treatment discrimination, however, the course of conduct 
Susan Jones has endured has yet to affect her employment terms, 
making the success of her claim highly unlikely. Consequently, 
Susan Jones will need a change in conventional legal wisdom in 
order to succeed. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has, possibly 
unwittingly, paved the way for Susan to make her claim. 
46 Many of the Supreme Court's seminal disparate treatment cases have involved 
tangible job benefits. E.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas Dep't 
of Community AffaJ.rs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 
792. 
47 That Title VII covers non-economic harm is clear. See Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination."). 
However, Vinson was a sexual harassment case in which the offensive nature of the alleged 
harassment caused the non-economic psychological harm. Id. at 60-61. That a number of 
courts have required an actual adverse employment decision after Vinson was decided 
suggests that many courts view disparate treatment and sexual harassment claims 
differently. 
~ Arguably, the hypothetical course of conduct includes any prior conduct by PW 
partners that has suggested that women should act femininely in order to succeed. See 
generally White, De Minimis Discrimination, supra note 13. 
49 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256-58 (1989) (discussing role of sexual 
stereotyping in employment decisions). 
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IV. SEXUAL HARAsSMENT 
Sexual harassment and disparate treatment have historically 
been distinguished by the style of conduct underlying each cause of 
action. Disparate treatment liability has usually resulted from a 
discriminatory employment decision. Sexual harassment liability, 
on the other hand, has typically resulted from unwelcome gender-
motivated harassment50 that results in the discriminatory provision 
of terms of employment. 51 To be clear, being harassed in the 
workplace, even because of one's sex, is not in itself actionable;52 
only when such unwelcome harassment changes an employee's 
terms of employment does the harassment become actionable. 53 
Recent scholarship suggests that sexual harassment's link to sex 
discrimination has not been adequately explained. 54 Nonetheless, 
50 Sexual harassment must be unwelcome to be actionable. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68 
C'The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 
unwelcome."). While unwelcomeness may be important when an employee does not mind 
being treated differently than someone of the opposite gender, if the harassment actually 
changes the terms of employment, it is possible that we should not care whether the 
harassment was welcome or unwelcome. See Hebert, supra note 3, at 577 (noting that often 
unwelcomeness of harassment need not be proven when context of denigrating and hostile 
conduct suggests unwelcomeness). Nonetheless, as sexual banter and sexual activity between 
co-workers can be consensual and desired, unwelcomeness can be in dispute in many 
harassment cases. 
&I See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (finding harassment actionable when it sufficiently alters 
conditions of employment). 
52 See Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that use of 
vulgar, sex-related taunts does not constitute sexual harassment when it is clear that taunts 
are part of personal vendetta unrelated to victim's gender); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 
F.3d 822, 827 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that even when harassment occurs, it may not cause 
workplace to become objectively hostile, as required for liability). 
53 Title VII, whether in the disparate treatment context or the sexual harassment 
context, does not cover harassment that falls below that level. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 
(noting that "not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, 
condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII"); Galloway v. General 
Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between 
rude comments directed at women and comments directed at a woman because she is a 
woman); Holtz v. Marcus Theatres Corp., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1147 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (''Merely 
yelling at female employees and calling them names does not rise to the level of actionable 
hostile work environment."); White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 746 (noting that 
discrimination at large is not prohibited and that discrimination becomes prohibited only 
when it affects terms, conditions, or privileges of employment). 
M Several recent articles have focused on what constitutes sexual harassment and why 
sexual harassment is sex discrimination. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual 
Harassment With Respect, 111 HARv. L. REv. 445 (1997) (detailing shortcomings of current 
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sexual harassment is sex discrimination. 55 When gender-motivated 
harassment alters an employee's terms of employment,56 such 
alteration is deemed to have occurred "because of sex," thereby 
violating Title VII. 57 
Whether an employer will be liable for such harassment under 
Title VII depends upon whether the employer is deemed responsible 
for the discrimination. Employer responsibility depends, in turn, on 
what the employer knew, when the employer knew it, and what 
steps the emp:oyer took to prevent or remedy the harassment that 
caused the discrimination.58 The employer, rather than the 
employee engaging in harassing conduct, is liable under Title VII59 
law); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 
692 (1997) C'While our intuitions may lead us to conclude that when a man directs offensive 
sexual conduct at a female colleague, sex discrimination is afoot, the Supreme Court has not 
offered a theory as to why this is the case."); Schultz, supra note 11. 
es See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (noting that sexual 
harassment is subsumed under Title VII); see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 
21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D. Me. 1998) (noting that differential treatment of sexes is key to 
sexual harassment claims). 
116 Nearly any benefit stemming from a job can be considered a term, condition or 
privilege of employment. See Jensvold v. Shalala, 925 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D. Md. 1996) 
(noting that many incidents of employment amount to terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment when they are traditionally afforded to employees in plaintiffs position). Indeed, 
seemingly insignificant differences can amount to discrimination under Title VII. See Carroll 
v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032·33 (7th Cir. 1979) (requiring women 
to wear uniforms while allowing men to wear own suits violates Title VII). But see supra 
notes 43-45. 
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1999) C'[A}n unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice."); Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64 C'Without question, when a supervisor 
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."); see also Willborn, supra note 10, at 687 (suggesting 
mixed motives type analysis for determining whether discrimination underlies conduct that 
may support sexual harassment claim). 
58 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808-09 (1998) (finding failure to 
disseminate sexual harassment policy and to keep track of supervisor's conduct to be 
ineffective communication of policy); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (discussing failure to 
promulgated sexual harassment policy as evidence of failure to fulfill obligation of reasonable 
care); Franke, supra note 54, at 701 n.29 (suggesting that employer liability standard for 
sexual harassment is "known or should have known"). 
59 Generally, individual employees who engage in sexual harassment will not be liable 
under Title VII. SEe Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) C'[A} supervisor 
does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title VII's definition of an employer .... "); 
Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995) C'Under Title VII there is no personal 
liability for employ•3es, including supervisors .... "); Miller v. Maxwell, Int'l, 991 F.2d 583, 
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because the employer is responsible for creating and maintaining 
the workplace as well as providing and tailoring the employment 
relationship, and must generally be responsible for discrimination 
in its provision.60 As a result, employer tolerance of or indifference 
to sexual harassment can be the precursor to Title VII liability. 61 
A. SEXUALLY HARASSING CONDUCT 
Sexual harassment may include sexual advances, sexually 
themed comments and conduct, and non-sexually themed comments 
and conduct. 62 While the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex appear to 
suggest that sexual harassment may be limited to "[u]nwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature,"63 the Supreme Court has made 
587-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no personal liability resulting from employment 
discrimination); see also Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability For 
Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509 (1996) (suggesting that personal liability for 
discrimination against employees is defensible but unwise). However, these employees may 
be liable under other laws. See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 158 (noting 
that under certain conditions sexual harassment can be criminal or tortious). 
110 When the terms of employment change, the employer must be held responsible. It is 
somewhat disingenuous to suggest that the employer is not responsible when an employee's 
conditions of employment are altered through harassment, given that the employer generally 
controls the conditions of employment. Without clear evidence to the contrary, a supervisor 
who is responsible for maintaining the workplace's atmosphere should know that the 
harassment is occurring. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57, 76 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("[A] supervisor is charged with the day-to-day supervision of the 
work environment and with ensuring a safe, productive workplace."). Arguably, when the 
supervisor knows or should have known that harassment is occurring, the employer knows 
or should have known as well However, this assumption might be problematic when the 
supervisor is the harassing employee. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810 ("The Court of Appeals 
also rejected the possibility that it could hold the City liable for the reason that it knew of the 
harassment vicariously through the knowledge of its supervisors. We have no occasion to 
consider whether this was error, however."). 
61 See Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 518 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that employer can be 
liable for sexual harassment if it knew or should have known ofharassment and failed to take 
corrective action); Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 702 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
hostile work environment prima facie case requires that plaintiff argue that employer knew 
or should have known about harassment but did not take remedial action). 
62 Commentators have suggested that much gender harassment is unrelated to sexuality. 
See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 11, at 1687 ("[M]uch of the time, harassment assumes a form 
that has little or nothing to do with sexuality but everything to do with gender."). 
63 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1999). 
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clear that sexual harassment includes harassment motivated by an 
employee's gender, whether it is of a sexual nature or not.64 In 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,65 the Court ruled that 
any harassment that could create an inference of discrimination 
because of sex could be actionable. 66 Though plaintiff Joseph Oncale 
was subject to sexualized harassment that could be considered of a 
sexual nature, including threats of rape, 67 the Court indicated that 
if the harassment were actionable, it would be so because it 
constituted discrimination because of sex. 68 Indeed, the Court noted 
that even non-sexualized harassment "motivated by general 
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace" could constitute 
sexual harassment. 69 Consequently, any harassment undertaken or 
motivated by the victim's gender can be considered sexual 
harassment. 70 
sc Despite the language in its guidelines, the EEOC seems to recognize that sexual 
harassment need not be of a sexual nature. See Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 
1565 nn.3-4 (noting that in 1993 the EEOC proposed guidelines that were subsequently 
withdrawn at behest of Congress indicating that "nonsexual conduct motivated by gender 
[could] also constitute discrimination on the basis of sex''); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1732 
C'Even though the EEOC Guidelines focus on sexual conduct, the EEOC has long recognized 
that nonsexual, gender-based harassment may violate Title Vll."). 
615 523 u.s. 75 1_1998). 
66 See id. at 80-81 (arguing that harassment need not be motivated by sexual desire to 
be classified as discrimination based on sex); White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 733 
("The question is not whether the harassment is sexual but whether it is being directed 
against this particular individual because of his sex.''). The Oncale Court further noted that 
"harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of sex." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
67 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77 (providing general description of conduct); see also Doe v. 
City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (noting 
plain tift's same-sex harassment, including grabbing of genitals and numerous sexual threats). 
81 Harassment can serve many gender-related ends without being focused on sexual 
activity. See Franke, supra note 54, at 696 ("Sexual harassment can also be understood to 
enforce gender norms when it is used to keep gender nonconformists in line.''); Schultz, supra 
note 11, at 1755 (noting that harassment can be used to attempt to keep certain jobs male 
bastions). 
118 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
70 One court suggested this years ago. See McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (noting that sexual harassment need not be sexualized to be actionable); see also 
Franke, supra note 54, at 696 (suggesting "reconceptualization of sexual harassment as 
gender harassment"); Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1567-68 ('Gender 
harassment-hostile and denigrating nonsexual activity directed at women because they are 
women (or at men because they are men)-differs from sexual harassment-sexual activity 
directed at women because they are women (or at men because they are men) often motivated 
by hostility and intended to be denigrating-only in the choice of weapon used.''); Schultz, 
1608 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1591 
The Oncale decision was momentous because it clarified what 
conduct is sufficient to support a sexual harassment claim and thus 
simplified the sexual harassment cause of action. Before Oncale, 
the requirement that actionable conduct be related to sexual desire 
or be of a sexual nature led to interesting ramifications for same-sex 
harassment. The restriction led some courts to limit same-sex 
harassment causes of action to those involving same-sex harassment 
by homosexuals who were presumably driven by sexual desire.71 
This left an employee who was sexually harassed by another person 
of the same gender without a claim unless the harassment was of a 
specific type. The Oncale Court shifted the focus of the harassment 
inquiry to whether an employee was harassed because of his sex, 
where Title VII suggests it should be. 
Harassment motivated by sexual desire, harassment undertaken 
because of gender, and sexualized harassment can all be considered 
discrimination because of sex. 72 However, an evidentiary distinction 
remains between harassment grounded in sexual desire and 
harassment not motivated by desire. Conduct motivated by sexual 
desire can generally be assumed to be motivated by the victim's 
gender,73 while conduct, not motivated by sexual desire must be 
supra note 11, at 1700 (discussing Carroll Brodsky's view that sexual harassment's scope is 
much broader than sexual advances; sexual harassment is not always "rooted in sexual desire 
or a need for sexual domination"). 
11 Courts have limited same-sex harassment claims in various ways. See Oncale, 523 
U.S. at 79 (discussing various ways courts have limited same-sex harassment claims, and 
noting that they were incorrect). 
11 See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 1998 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that there 
are myriad ways to engage in harassment, including through opposite-sex sexual advances, 
same-sex sexual advances, and non-sexual general hostility); Penry v. Federal Home Loan 
Bank, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (lOth Cir. 1998) ("Conduct that is overtly sexual may be presumed 
to be because of the victim's gender; however, actionable conduct is not limited to behavior 
motivated by sexual desire."); Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality 
in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 399, 410 (1996) (noting distinction between gender-specific harassment and gender-based 
sexual harassment); Willbom, supra note 10, at 685-86 (differentiating conduct of sexual 
nature and conduct not of sexual nature). 
73 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The Court in Oncale noted: 
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to 
draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the 
challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals 
of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would 
not have been made to someone of the same sex. 
Id.; see also Schultz, supra note 11, at 17 41 (noting that courts have suggested that "sexually 
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proven to be motivated by the victim's sex to be actionable.74 
Nonetheless, an employee may be harassed through a single 
continuous course of sexual harassment that includes any 
combination of conduct, whether related to sexual desire or not.75 
B. TYPES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Sexual harassment consists of two branches: quid pro quo and 
hostile work environment harassment. 76 Quid pro quo sexual 
harassment requires that an actual job detriment be conditioned on 
and occur as a result of sexual harassment. The prototypical 
example of qui'.d pro quo harassment posits a supervisor who fires 
an employee for refusing to provide sexual favors. 77 Hostile work 
explicit advances are presumed to be sex-based while other problems must be proven so"). 
But see White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 733 ("The [Oncale] Court also rejected the 
contention that when harassment is sexual it is necessarily gender-based.''). 
74 Interestingly, the differing nature of conduct of a sexual nature and conduct not of a 
sexual nature has led some courts to analyze the two types of conduct separately in 
determining if a Title VII claim exists. E.g., King v. Board of Regents ofUniv. of Wis., 898 
F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990) (disaggregating sexualized harassment and non-sexualized 
harassment); see Schultz, supra note 11, at 1711-12, 1716-20 (discussing courts that treat 
harassment of sexual nature differently than harassment not of sexual nature); see also 
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D. Me. 1998) 
(distinguishing sex and gender discrimination). 
75 If a group of employees engages in sex-based and non-sex-based harassment to harass 
one of their co-workers because of that co-worker's sex, their conduct may not escape scrutiny 
merely because neither the sex-based harassment alone nor the non-sex-based harassment 
alone would be sufficient to support a cognizable claim. See, e.g., Stacks v. Southwestern Bell 
Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir. 1994} (noting that conduct supporting hostile 
work environment claim need not be solely sexual in nature); Robinson v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (detailing harassment related to sexual 
activity and harassment unrelated to sexual activity). Some commentators have suggested 
that courts should be clearer in finding that harassment not of a sexual nature can be 
aggregated with conduct of a sexual nature in determining that sexual harassment occurred. 
See Franke, supra note 54, at 1709 (suggesting that courts treat harassment of sexual nature 
and sexual harassment not of sexual nature as part of single course of conduct). 
78 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1998) (noting that quid pro quo 
and hostile work environment discrimination have been considered, although arguably 
incorrectly, different categories of sexual harassment); Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (distinguishing quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment); 
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (lOth Cir. 1987) ("Although sexual 
harassment may take a variety of forms, courts have consistently recognized two distinct 
categories of sexual harassment claims: quid pro quo sexual harassment, and hostile work 
environment sexual harassment."). 
71 See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1701 ("Women lost some of the first Title VII cases 
challenging harassment. These cases involved the by-now-familiar fact pattern: Female 
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environment harassment, on the other hand, merely requires that 
an employee's terms of employment be constructively altered by the 
harassment. The typical hostile work environment is a workplace 
tinged with sexual advances, explicit sex talk, sexual innuendo, 
gender-based hostility, or some combination of such conduct that is 
severe enough to affect an employee's ability to do her job.78 Quid 
pro quo and hostile work environment harassment have been 
thought to be different because the conduct typically supporting 
each claim is somewhat distinct.79 The Supreme Court, however, 
recently made clear that the distinction between quid pro quo and 
hostile work environment sexual harassment is the concreteness of 
the harm the harassment causes rather than the style of conduct 
underlying each cause of action.80 
plaintiffs complained that they had been fired or mistreated for refusing their male superiors' 
sexual advances."). 
78 See Aldridge v. Kansas, No. 96-2382-JWL, 1997 WL 614323, at *10 (D. Kan. Sept. 10, 
1997) C'Rather than subjecting plaintiff to a few sexual comments, however, the plain tift's 
evidence, ifbelieved, is that Mr. Pritchard made weekly suggestive comments about plain tift's 
breasts and buttocks for a period of over four years. When viewed together with his other, 
more sporadic unwelcome sexual innuendos, allegations, and advances, a reasonable and 
prudent person could conclude that Mr. Pritchard's actions were sufficiently pervasive to 
create a hostile work environment."); Stoeckel v. Environmental Management Sys., Inc., 882 
F. Supp. 1106, 1115 n.l3 (D.D.C. 1995) C'The Court notes that cases in which other courts 
have found conduct to constitute hostile work environment discrimination typically involve 
explicit sexual advances toward the recipient, sexual innuendo, sexual comments or 
derogatory comments to the recipient in the presence of other employees, comments or 
actions of a lewd or tasteless nature, and similarly severe behavior."); cf. Schultz, supra note 
11, at 1710 C'To a large extent, the courts have restricted the conception of hostile work 
environment harassment to male-female sexual advances and other explicitly sexualized 
actions perceived to be driven by sexual designs.''). 
79 Not only are the two types of harassment different, quid pro quo harassment is 
arguably worse. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The most oppressive 
and invidious type of workplace sexual harassment is quid pro quo sex."). 
80 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742 (noting precedent that required harassment to be severe 
or pervasive if making hostile environment claim); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775 (1998) (noting that whether environment is hostile or abusive depends on looking at all 
circumstances including frequency and severity of conduct). While the Supreme Court never 
explicitly distinguished quid pro quo and hostile work environment discrimination on the 
basis of the style of conduct underlying each claim, it has recognized that others have. See 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751 C'The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful, 
perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and 
those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility."); 
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (noting and implicitly accepting EEOC's distinction between hostile 
work environment and quid pro quo harassment). 
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1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment 
explicitly alters the terms of an employee's employment.81 Thus, a 
supervisor who conditions the avoidance of job detriment on an 
employee's provision of sexual favors, then takes adverse action 
when the employee declines to grant those favors has engaged in 
quid pro quo harassment. 82 The harassment is undertaken for 
personal gratification with the leverage being the power and 
willingness to change concrete terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment. Since the harassment stems from the employee's 
sex, 83 the discl'iminatory provision of the terms of employment has 
occurred because of sex, and Title VII is therefore violated. 84 The 
81 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752 (indicating that quid pro quo harassment concerns explicit 
alterations in terms or conditions of employment and that hostile work environment 
harassment concerns constructive alterations in terms or conditions of employment). 
112 In some situations, linking job benefits with sex is not actionable. See EEOC: Policy 
Guide on Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism Under Title VII, 8 Lab. ReL Rep. (BNA) 
No. 694, at 6817 (Jan. 12, 1990) (noting that preferential treatment based on consensual 
romantic relationship may be unfair to women and men and is therefore generally not in 
violation of Title VII because both are disadvantaged for reasons other than gender); see also 
Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences, 167 F.3d 1170, 1175 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(suggesting that sexual favoritism in form of giving job benefits to person with whom one is 
having affair is likely not sufficient to support another worker's hostile work environment 
claim); Elger v. Martin Mem'l Health Sys., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1353·54 (S.D. Fla. 1998) 
(noting that claim that plaintiff was terminated so that his boss's girlfriend could be promoted 
to plaintiff's job was not hostile work environment claim, rather it was akin to nepotism not 
actionable under Title VII); Ayers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 826 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D. 
Fla. 1993) (determining that favoritism in hiring or promoting former lovers is more akin to 
nepotism than sexism and is not prohibited by Title VII). Of course, this is problematic. Title 
VII is supposed to remove the link between sex and employment from the workplace. 
Allowing job benefits to be linked to sex allows this link to remain. Consequently, if Title VII 
were read relatively expansively, any person who was denied a job benefit because the benefit 
went to someone who was a sexual favorite of the supervisor could sue. But see Michael J. 
Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action for Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 
547, 549-50 (1994) (disagreeing with many courts and commentators who have suggested that 
Title VII liability could lie for harm to those disadvantaged by sexual favoritism). 
83 We assume the supervisor would not have added the term to the employment 
relationship of a person of the opposite gender. Although, under this theory, a bisexual 
supervisor escapes exposing the employer to Title VII liability, this is of little moment. See 
Willborn, supra note 10, at 683 n.22 (noting rarity of bisexual harasser). Regardless of how 
offensive a supervisor's behavior may be, if the supervisor's action is not taken because of sex 
or on the basis of sex, Title VII does not appear to prohibit the behavior. However, other 
statutes may. See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 158 (suggesting that 
many acts of sexual harassment could be treated as independently criminal or tortious). 
84 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that harassment would 
not have occurred had plaintiff been male); Franke, supra note 54, at 702-05 (noting that one 
justification for treating sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII was that 
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actual job detriment is proof that the terms of the employment 
relationship were concretely altered. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has recently ruled that actual job detriment must visit a plaintiff 
before an actionable quid pro quo harassment claim arises, meaning 
that actual job detriment is the only proof sufficient to demonstrate 
the concrete alteration of employment terms. 
In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 85 plaintiff Kimberly Ellerth 
charged that Ted Slowik, her supervisor's superior, harassed her by 
making numerous inappropriate sexual comments regarding her 
dress and appearance. The offending comments included possible 
threats to harm Ellerth's employment if she did not provide sexual 
liberties or act in a more sexually accessible manner. 86 Rather than 
face additional harassment, Ellerth quit her job of fourteen 
months. 87 The Court indicated that until Ellerth suffered actual job 
detriment, her treatment could not be considered quid pro quo 
sexual harassment: 
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible 
employment action resulted from a refusal to 
submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she 
establishes that the employment decision itself 
constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of 
employment that is actionable under Title VII. 
harassment occurred because of employee's sex). But see Schultz, supra note 11, at 1701 
(explaining that in early cases, discrimination on basis of refusal to yield to sexual advances 
was not viewed as discrimination because of sex). Of course, quid pro quo harassment can 
be analogized to disparate treatment sex discrimination. The harassed employee's 
employment relationship includes an additional term of employment-submission to a 
supervisor's sexual advances-not required of employees of the opposite sex. See Michelle 
Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 17, 
39-40 {1998) ("Courts began to rule that Title VII was violated because submission to a sexual 
act was made a condition of employment for a woman but not for a man; consequently, sexual 
harassment was understood to be sexual discrimination 'because of a woman's gender."). 
1111 524 u.s. 742 (1998). 
86 Of particular note was Slowik's comment that he could make life easy or hard for 
Ellerth at Burlington. Id. at 748. The Court concluded that a "trier of fact could find in 
Slowik's remarks numerous threats to retaliate against Ellerth if she denied some sexual 
liberties." Id. at 751. Indeed, Slowik may have attempted to delay Ellerth's promotion by 
commenting negatively on some of her personality traits. See id. at 748 C'Slowik expressed 
resolutions during [a] promotion interview because [Ellerth] was not 'loose enough.'"). 
87 Id. 
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For any sexual harassment preceding the 
employment decision to be actionable, however, 
the conduct must be severe or pervasive. Because 
Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it 
should be categorized as a hostile work 
environment claim which requires a showing of 
severe or pervasive conduct.88 
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Though the Court found that a reasonable factfinder could have 
determined that Slowik explicitly threatened Ellerth's employment, 
it concluded that Ellerth could not state a quid pro quo claim 
because she had not suffered any tangible job detriment. Even 
though Ellerth's fear that Slowik would hinder her career caused 
her to quit after only fourteen months, likely hurting her career in 
the short term, Ellerth's resignation did not constitute actual job 
detriment. Presumably, the Court would require a claim akin to 
constructive discharge for Ellerth's resignation to be deemed a 
tangible job detriment. 89 
The Ellerth Court certainly clarified exactly what quid pro quo 
harassment is: sexual harassment resulting in actual job detriment. 
The Court, however, by focusing on job detriment rather than the 
terms of employment as the employee understood them, may have 
fundamentally altered the quid pro quo harassment claim as well. 
After Ellerth, quid pro quo harassment requires that threats 
actually be fulfilled; the making of threats is no longer sufficient. 
The Court minimized the importance of conditioning of job benefits 
on sexual activity by eliminating the possibility that terms of 
employment may be concretely altered by such conditioning alone. 90 
11 Id. 
118 Proof of a hostile work environment may not be sufficient to prove constructive 
discharge. See Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999) 
("To show 'constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show more than just a Title VII violation 
by her employer.'" (quoting Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 1998))); 
see also Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that hostile 
work environment can exist well before plaintiff is constructively discharged). 
90 Other couru have suggested that the conditioning of job benefits on sexual activity is 
a very important aspect of the harassment. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 
1994) ("[W]e hold that quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs whenever an individual 
explicitly or implicitly conditions a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon 
an employee's acceptance of sexual conduct."); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 44 F.3d 773, 779 
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The Court did this even though the conditioning of benefits on 
sexual activity may cause the employee to react to the putative 
change in terms of employment by acquiescing to the unwanted 
harassment, resisting the harassment forcefully enough to cause the 
supervisor to impose job detriment, or quitting the job.91 While the 
Supreme Court may have merely been suggesting that actual job 
detriment is conclusive proof that terms of employment had been 
altered, its language suggests otherwise. Rather than indicate that 
actual job detriment or any other competent proof would serve as 
evidence that job benefits had been conditioned on sexual activity, 92 
the Court noted explicitly that actual job detriment was necessary. 93 
The Court's decision in Ellerth is clear. When the implications of 
Ellerth and Oncale are combined, however, an interesting issue 
regarding the scope of quid pro quo harassment arises. Before 
Ellerth and Oncale, quid pro quo sexual harassment was typified by 
and limited to a supervisor's advances to a subordinate that 
concretely altered the terms of that subordinate's employment. 
After Ellerth and Oncale, quid pro quo sexual harassment should be 
considered actionable whenever non-acquiescence to sexual 
harassment of any form results in tangible job detriment.94 That 
construct would allow any sexual harassment, including physical or 
(2d Cir. 1994) ("[O]nce an employer conditions any terms of employment upon the employee's 
submitting to unwelcome sexual advances, a quid pro quo claim is made out, regardless of 
whether the employee (a) rejects the advances and suffers the consequences, or (b) submits 
to the advances in order to avoid those consequences.''); Quarles v. McDuffie County, 949 F. 
Supp. 846, 852 (S.D. Ga. 1996) ("Quid pro quo sexual harassment requires proof that 
plaintiffs acceptance of the harassment is an express or implied condition to receiving a job 
benefit or not receiving negative treatment."). 
91 Indeed, even implicit conditioning of terms on sexual activity can be problematic. See 
Nichols, 42 F.3d at 512 ("We note that difficult factual and legal questions will almost always 
arise whenever either the conditioning ofbenefits (or absence of detriment) or the request for 
favors is not explicit, but is instead implicit in the harasser's communications or dealings with 
his prey.''). 
92 Now that the focus of quid pro quo harassment is job detriment rather than the 
conditioning of concrete job terms on sexual activity, quid pro quo harassment is quite similar 
to disparate treatment sex discrimination. See infra Part IV. 
93 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54. 
s.c The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard and rejected this 
theory before Ellerth was issued by the Supreme Court. See Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 
1266, 1274-75 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that generalized harassment could serve 
to support quid pro quo claim when employee's refusal to acquiesce in such banter was reason 
employee was terminated). The argument might fare differently now. 
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verbal harassment from supervisors, co-workers, or anyone else in 
the workplace, 95 to support a quid pro quo claim if actual job 
detriment flowed from non-acquiescence to the harassment. For 
example, giving less lucrative tables to a waitress who does not 
allow customers to touch or grab her should amount to quid pro quo 
sexual harassment if male waiters were not forced to endure such 
harassment. 96 That such conduct should be treated as quid pro quo 
sexual harassment is sensible because gender-based harassment 
has caused actual job detriment. While the Supreme Court has not 
yet ruled that quid pro quo harassment covers such conduct, no 
doctrinal impediments exist to such a decision. 
After Ellerth and Oncale, the quid pro quo sexual harassment 
claim looks like a disparate treatment claim where the relevant 
conduct amounts to sexual harassment. This simplification of sex 
discrimination jurisprudence may expand liability under Title VII. 
While the quid pro quo action will always involve a superior, as a 
superior is the only person able to visit actual job detriment on an 
employee, it may not be limited to situations where the superior has 
engaged in the conduct that preceded the job detriment. Removing 
this limitation may produce liability for any employment decision 
related to harassment, rather than limiting recovery to situations 
in which the superior's harassment led directly to the decision that 
caused the job detriment. 
Unfortunately, this will not yet help Susan Jones, our 
hypothetical plaintiff. Her case is not a quid pro quo harassment 
case because she does not appear to have suffered job detriment. 
While her resignation may have been caused by her belief that she 
would suffer tangible job detriment, the conduct involved is unlikely 
to rise to the level of a constructive discharge. Additionally, 
96 Sexual hara~mentinflicted by non-employees can support a sexual harassment claim. 
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1999) \An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-
employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the 
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct 
and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action."). 
116 See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 2 (noting that advances by 
customers should be considered workplace sexual harassment). This claim could be 
considered akin to a hostile work environment claim because the environment literally 
becomes hostile. The facts suggested, however, fit within the Court's simplified vision of quid 
pro quo harassment. 
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although the sentiments underlying her treatment were largely 
unwelcome, the treatment itself is unlikely to be considered 
harassing. 97 
2. Hostile Work Environment Harassment. Hostile work 
environment sexual harassment is relatively easy to define, but 
difficult to describe precisely.98 In general terms, hostile work 
environment sexual harassment is unwelcome99 gender-motivated 
harassment that constructively alters the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment without causing tangible job detriment. 100 
The major legal distinction between hostile work environment and 
quid pro quo harassment is that tangible job detriment is 
unnecessary for a hostile work environment harassment claim.101 
The major practical distinction between the two types of claims is 
that hostile work environment harassment must be severe or 
pervasive102 to be actionable. 108 Though the Supreme Court has 
81 Although the distinction between harassing and merely discriminatory commenta may 
be narrow, the comments Susan Jones faced appear to be clearly of the discriminatory type. 
98 See Bernstein, supra note 54, at 448 (noting Supreme Court's general inability to 
describe hostile work environment harassment adequately). 
su Whether unwelcomeness should be required in hostile work environment cases is 
debatable. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1729·32 (suggesting problems with unwelcomeness 
requirement). Indeed, some have suggested abolishing unwelcomeness as an element of the 
sexual harassment cause of action. See, e.g., Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 588 
("The abandonment of the unwelcomeness requirement for sexual harassment claints would 
serve to bring the law of sexual harassment into line with the law applicable to other 
employment discrimination clainls under Title Vll."); Willborn, supra note 10, at 697·98 
(stating that unwelcomeness is not element of harassment cause of action under 
discrimination-centered model). For a good discussion comparing unwelcomeness 
requirement in the racial and sexual harassment areas, see L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing 
Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 Omo ST. L.J. 819, 849-53 (1997) 
[hereinafter Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex]. 
100 The elements of a hostile work environment are described more fully in other legal 
commentary. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 72, at 411-15 (1996); see also Schultz, supra note 
11, at 1714 ("The essence of a hostile work environment claim is that actions for which the 
defendant is responsible have made the work environment more difficult for women (or men) 
because of their sex."); White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 726-27 C'In Meritor, the Court 
set forth a standard for determining when a hostile work environment will be present: 
Unwelcome sexual conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to constitute a hostile 
or abusive working environment will support a Title Vll claim."). 
101 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751·52 (1998) (noting that distinction 
between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment is concrete versus 
constructive alteration of terms, conditions, or privileges of employment). 
102 The offending conduct need not be both severe and pervasive. See Smith v. Northwest 
Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1413 (lOth Cir. 1997) C'The Meritor test is a disjunctive 
one, requiring that the harassing conduct be sufficiently pervasive or sufficiently severe to 
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ruled that an employee's terms of employment are not constructively 
altered absent severe or pervasive harassment, the Court has not 
indicated what conduct might be minimally sufficient to meet the 
severe or pervasive standard, 104 even declining to determine 
whether a single instance ofharassment is categorically insufficient 
to support a hostile work environment claim.105 The Court has 
explained only that, in addition to being severe or pervasive, 
actionable hostile work environment harassment must create an 
environment that was subjectively problematic for the plaintiff and 
would be objectively problematic for a reasonable person. 106 
alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of Plaintiff's employment."). 
103 Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also Indest v. Freeman 
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing Ellerth, Faragher, and Oncale 
as "hold[ing] that sexual harassment which does not culminate in an adverse employment 
decision must, to create a hostile work environment, be severe or pervasive"); Deborah 
Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as Gender-Based Discriminatory 
(Mis)Treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649 (1997). 
Professor Epstein argues: 
Id. at663. 
[A] plaintiff must show that the harassment is either severe or 
pervasive. The required showing of severity varies inversely with 
the pervasiveness of the abuse; because verbal harassment is 
inherently less severe than ita physical counterpart, it will be 
actionable only in extreme situations when it saturates a target's 
work environment. 
104 The Court bas not set a clear standard; rather it bas set a fuzzy standard with clarity. 
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) \We have made it clear that 
conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of 
employment[.]"); 'Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (noting that sexual harassment must be severe or 
pervasive to be actionable). 
105 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 ("[W]e accept the District Court's finding that the alleged 
conduct was severe or pervasive .... The case before us involves numerous alleged threats, 
and we express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute 
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment."); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., 
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22·23 (1993) (noting imprecise nature of determining what is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment); Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 
F .3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that in hostile work environment cases, context 
matters and that incidents must be interpreted in context of workplace). 
101 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; Penry v. Federal Home Loan 
Bank, ll'i5 F.3d 1257, 1261 (lOth Cir. 1998) (noting that hostile work environment must be 
objectively and subjectively hostile); Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408 
(lOth Cir. 1997) (indicating that workplace must be objectively and subjectively hostile). In 
the hostile work environment context, courts appear to want to make certain that working 
conditions are quite bad before an employer is held liable. See, e.g., Black v. Zaring Homes, 
Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997) (overturning jury verdict because court was not 
sufficiently offended by comments to find objectively hostile work environment). 
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A work environment need not literally be "hostile" to support a 
hostile work environment claim. As EEOC Guidelines note, hostile 
work environment harassment includes conduct which "has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's 
work performance or create[s] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment."107 Thus, a hostile work environment can be 
viewed as simply one in which an employee has an unreasonably 
more difficult time doing her job because of her gender.108 Of course, 
this does not require an employee to claim that her work became 
substandard as a result of the harassment.109 While an employee's 
work might be more difficult to do because of harassment or 
workplace atmosphere, it may clearly remain of good quality.110 
The harm of a hostile work environment is not merely the impact 
that the harassment may have on the employee's work, it is also in 
the toll that such harassment can take on the employee's psyche.111 
Both physical stress and mental distress often accompany hostile 
work environment harassment. Indeed, until Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc., 112 some courts believed that severe emotional distress 
was required before a hostile work environment claim was 
cognizable. 113 Fortunately, the Harris Court held that psychological 
107 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1l(a)(3) (1999)). 
108 This is one way to prove that a hostile work environment exists. See Harris, 510 U.S. 
at 23 (noting that proving harassment interfered with employee's work performance is 
method of proving that hostile work environment exists); Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow 
Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that key issue in hostile work 
environment case is whether employee suffered disadvantageous terms of employment 
because of sex); Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Wainer & Assocs., 866 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 
1994) ("In order to constitute sexual harassment, a plaintiffs work environment must 
unreasonably interfere with her work performance or be intimidating, hostile or offensive."). 
100 See Smith, 129 F.3d at 1413 (ruling that "plaintiff is not required to prove that her 
tangible productivity or work performance declined or that her ability to do her job was 
impaired by [harassment]"). 
110 Complaining that one's work conditions are inferior does not necessarily indicate that 
one's work was substandard. In Faragher, Ellerth, and Vinson, the plaintiffs' workplace 
atmospheres appeared to be hostile, though each appears to have been a competent employee. 
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 (noting that Faragher had worked at her job for five years); 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 7 48 (noting that Ellerth had received promotion prior to quitting due to 
harassment); Vinson, 477 U.S. at 59·60 (indicating that Vinson was repeatedly promoted on 
merit alone). 
111 Bernstein, supra note 54, at 462; Epstein, supra note 72, at 405. 
liZ 510 u.s. 17 (1993). 
113 I d. at 20 (noting that Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve split among circuits 
regarding whether serious psychological harm is required to state hostile work environment 
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distress is merely one factor to consider in determining if an 
employee has been subjected to a hostile work environment.114 
Hostile work environment harassment and quid pro quo 
harassment have traditionally described different workplace 
problems.116 Quid pro quo harassment has traditionally focused on 
the explicit trading of sex for the avoidance ofjob detriment, while 
hostile work environment harassment has traditionally focused on 
an employee's reaction to environmental harassment in the 
workplace. This traditional distinction is illustrated in Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 116 where the Supreme Court first 
recognized the viability of a hostile work environment claim. In 
Vinson, the Court recounted plaintiff Mechelle Vinson's testimony 
that her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, made sexual advances toward 
her, fondled her, and raped her on several occasions.117 Though 
Vinson testified that she had, after initially refusing Taylor's 
advances, agreed to have sexual relations with him, she indicated 
that she did so out of fear oflosing her job. 118 Taylor denied that he 
made any inappropriate comments, sexual advances, or engaged in 
any sexual activity with Vinson.119 The conduct alleged in Vinson 
did not constitute quid pro quo harassment because, according to 
the Court, no concrete terms or conditions of employment were 
conditioned on Vinson's acquiescence to sexual activity and no 
economic harm in the form of reduced job benefits flowed from the 
putative harassment. 120 
claim). 
114 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 ("The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of 
course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. 
But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no 
single factor is required."). 
115 But see Franke, supra note 54, at 691 (suggesting that hostile work environment 
harassment in toto .items from disparate treatment discrimination); White, Nothing Special, 
supra note 2, at 729 (suggesting that disparate treatment analysis should generally guide 
analysis of all sexual harassment claims). 
JIG 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
117 Id. at 60. 
m Id. 
119 Id. at 61. 
120 Vinson apparently received all promotions to which she was entitled. See id. at 59·60 
(documenting Vinson's promotion pattern). 
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Although the Court was uncertain whether sexual advances 
occurred and whether they were unwelcome even if they did occur, 121 
it determined that Vinson's hostile work environment claim was 
viable since the conduct Vinson charged appeared to be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to constructively alter the terms or conditions of 
Vinson's employment, if proven.122 Mechelle Vinson's working 
conditions may have included demands for sex, explicit sexual 
advances, and more subtle signals suggesting that part of her 
function was to be sexually available to her supervisor. Although 
her terms of employment may not have been explicitly altered, they 
may have been discriminatorily provided because Vinson had to 
endure such working conditions because she was a woman. 
The lesson of Vinson seemed relatively simple. Repeatedly 
requesting sexual favors from an employee without more could 
constitute hostile work environment harassment because of the 
effect it could have on the employee's working conditions; repeatedly 
demanding sexual favors from a subordinate and linking concrete 
job benefits to those favors could constitute quid pro quo 
harassment precisely because of the linkage of sex to explicit terms 
of employment.123 
Despite the Vinson Court's lesson, the Ellerth Court 
distinguished quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
harassment based on whether the conduct charged caused actual job 
detriment. As a result, hostile work environment harassment can 
be divided into two types: pre-quid pro quo and atmospheric. I call 
one type pre-quid pro quo harassment because it is functionally 
equivalent to quid pro quo harassment and is exemplified by 
121 According to Vinson, Taylor stopped harassing Vinson once she began dating someone 
else. ld. at 60. 
122 See id. at 67 (noting that Vinson's allegations were "plainly sufficient to state a claim 
for 'hostile environment' sexual harassment"). Of course, if the facts in Vinson were changed 
slightly, the plaintiff could have demonstrated quid pro quo harassment. For example, had 
Taylor fired Vinson in response to a refusal to engage in sexual relations with him, as Vinson 
feared, the case would have been a quid pro quo harassment case. 
123 Note that sexual harassment need not be sexualized. See supra Part N.A. Indeed, 
some commentators suggest that sexualizing the hostile work environment is problematic. 
See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1710 (suggesting that sexualization of hostile work 
environment obscures "some of the most pervasive forms of gender hostility experienced on 
a day-to-day basis by many women (and men) in the workplace"). 
2000] SEX DISCRIMINATION 1621 
unfulfilled threats to an employee's terms of employment.124 I call 
the other type atmospheric harassment because it is exemplified by 
a working environment that is sufficiently ingrained with sexual 
advances, sex-based discrimination, or manifestations of gender 
inequality or hostility to effectively alter the conditions of the 
employee's employment because of sex.125 
a. Pre-Quid Pro Quo Harassment. Pre-quid pro quo 
harassment is identical to quid pro quo sexual harassment, except 
that pre-quid pro quo harassment does not yield actual job 
detriment. 126 Unfulfilled gender-motivated threats to concrete 
terms of employment, at most, constitute pre-quid pro quo hostile 
work environment harassment.127 For example, a supervisor who 
tells a subordinate, "Sleep with me or I will make sure you never get 
another promotion," but who does not act on the threat, only 
engages in pre-quid pro quo harassment. 128 This clarifies the 
relationship between quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
harassment. If quid pro quo harassment encompasses the 
conditioning of concrete terms of employment on sexual activity, as 
124 See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 7 42, 7 47 ·48 (1998) (finding that Ellerth 
received demands that "could be construed as threats to deny her tangible job benefits"). 
126 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998) (noting that 
Faragher's work environment included demeaning comments and unwanted touching); 
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp.1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (describing extensive 
harassment, including repeated anonymous postings of nude calendars in workplace). 
!d. 
126 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. The Court noted: 
Cases based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as 
quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual 
remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile 
work environment. The terms quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation 
between cases in which threats are carried out and those where they 
are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited 
utility. 
127 Interestingly, the trial court in Ellerth indicated that there was a quid pro quo 
component to Ellerth's claim. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1121 (N.D. Ill. 
1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was split on whether 
Ellerth had proven a quid pro quo claim. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 
490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997). 
121 A similar threat was made in Faragher. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 ("Date me or 
clean the toilets for a year."). The impact of the threat on the plaintiffs employment was 
unclear. 
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some courts have suggested it should, 129 the above threat would 
support a quid pro quo claim. 130 That such a threat, if unfulfilled, 
is only sufficient to support a hostile work environment claim 
cements the notion that the concreteness of the harm visited upon 
an employee is the sole distinction between quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment harassment. 
The impact of the "severe or pervasive" requirement on pre-quid 
pro quo claims further supports this point. Severity or 
pervasiveness is required to ensure that the employee's terms of 
employment have sufficiently changed when no actual job detriment 
has occurred. The "severe or pervasive" requirement thus acts as a 
proxy for actual job detriment in the pre-quid pro quo harassment 
context. However, the severity or pervasiveness of the subject 
threat may not have any impact on whether a credible threat 
convinces the employee that the terms of her employment have 
changed. Indeed, pervasive threats that are not fulfilled may, over 
time, appear to the employee to be less likely to be fulfilled, and may 
become less credible. 
When credible threats are made in the pre-quid pro quo context, 
little reason exists to question whether the terms of employment 
have actually changed. 131 The terms of employment change, at least 
in an employee's mind, when one's supervisor, who may be 
129 See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that implicit 
suggestion that job benefits were based on sexual activity constitutes quid pro quo 
harassment); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that 
employee who acquiesces to unwelcome sexual advances may state quid pro quo claim when 
"the supervisor has linked tangible job benefits to the acceptance or rejection of sexual 
advances"); see also Jansen, 123 F .3d at 499 (Flaum, J., concurring) (noting that "a clear and 
serious quid pro quo threat alters the 'terms and conditions' of employment in such a way as 
to violate Title VII and therefore can constitute an actionable claim even if the threat remains 
unfulfilled"). 
130 Whether credible or not, the threat also might be part of a general atmospheric hostile 
work environment claim. In Oncale and Faragher, threats of this sort were part of a hostile 
work environment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
523 u.s. 75, 77 (1998). 
131 Of course, any inappropriate request from a supervisor may appear to carry an implied 
threat. See Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, With 
Particular Application To Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1081 (1999) C'In the 
case of solicitation by a supervisor, the obvious explanation for why the 'offer' is resented is 
that it often carries with it an implied threat to fire or otherwise discriminate against the 
woman if she refuses. The resentment may be a product of the threat rather than of the 
solicitation per se."). 
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empowered to change the terms of employment, says that the terms 
have changed. If a supervisor credibly asserts that the terms of 
employment have changed, that no actual job detriment has 
occurred does not mean that the terms have not changed;132 it 
means that the supervisor has not acted to effectuate the changed 
terms. Simply, a term of employment can be altered through 
harassment that may be considered neither severe nor pervasive in 
a colloquial sense. 133 
The concerns attending unfulfilled threats to employment are 
akin to those accompanying quid pro quo harassment. Consider 
those situations in which a supervisor does not have the opportunity 
or need to fulfill a threat (i.e., when an employee quits or acquiesces 
to the advances).134 In those cases, the harasser may get what he 
wants without acting on the threat. If the employee acquiesces, the 
132 It cannot be the case that the terms, conditions or privileges of employment do not 
change until the supervisor acts on the threats. Assume that a supervisor offers jobs to two 
secretarial applicants, one male and one female with annual salaries of$30,000 and $20,000, 
respectively, for no reason other than gender. Ifboth applicants accept the offers, the terms 
of the female secr•~tary's offer will be discriminatory even before she receives her first 
paycheck. While a court might limit some portion of her damages to salary accrued, surely 
that court would not suggest that the terms of the female secretary's agreement might not 
be discriminatory because her boss might pay her a $30,000 salary. To further illustrate, 
consider a hypothetical university where men are required to produce four articles before 
being tenured while women are required to produce five articles before being tenured. At that 
university, women are being discriminated against even before a specific job detriment visits 
a particular plaintiff. Although damages may be difficult to calculate, a female employee who 
produces five articles and is granted tenure is still a victim of sex discrimination. Similarly, 
in the context of Ellerth, little suggests that the terms of Ellerth's employment were not 
actually changedjust because Slowik might not have successfully halted Ellerth's promotions. 
See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 1524 U.S. 7 42, 7 48 (1998) (noting that Slowik raised concerns 
about Ellerth possibly in attempt to halt her promotion). 
133 For example, the threat that Faragher needed to date her supervisor or clean the 
toilets for a year might be deemed neither severe nor pervasive. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
The severity is only apparent if the threat is fulfilled. In that case, however, the harassment 
is quid pro quo harassment. Some might answer that being forced to prove severity or 
pervasiveness is likely not a problem when a supervisor's threat is credible. Not only is this 
argument not at all clear, it is beside the point. After Title Vlfs enactment, a woman should 
not be forced to deal with threats to her employment based on her willingness to engage in 
sexual activity, let alone be forced to gauge which threats are severe or pervasive enough to 
be actionable. 
134 Mechelle Vinson may have acquiesced to what she believed to be implicit threats; 
Kimberly Ellerth quit. Both claimed harm, though neither of their supervisors needed to 
fulfill the threats to their employment. See supra notes 85-89, 114-120 and accompanying text 
(outlining factual scenarios of these two cases). 
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harasser engages in desired sexual activity;135 if the employee quits, 
the harasser need not interact with the sexually unavailable 
subordinate. In either case, an employee's terms of employment 
have been altered because her supervisor provided a discriminatory 
term. The supervisor's dominion and control over the employee is 
precisely the concern accompanying quid pro quo harassment, 136 
where the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct is not 
particularly important. This concern is particularly salient when 
the harassment is severe or pervasive enough to influence that 
employee into acquiescing or quitting, but not severe or pervasive 
enough to change the terms or conditions of employment according 
to a court or jury. 137 Some have noted that whether the employee 
submits to the harassment or quits ultimately depends on economic 
factors that may be unrelated to the severity or pervasiveness of the 
harassment. 138 
The Court has determined that pre-quid pro quo harassment is 
hostile work environment harassment, even though it looks like 
quid pro quo harassment. This determination makes clear that the 
old ways of thinking of quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
harassment may no longer be useful.139 Rather than differentiating 
1116 Giving a harasser any leeway to harass in this situation is surely unfair. Cf. Karibian 
v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 773 (2d Cir. 1994} ("Under the district court's rationale, only 
the employee who successfully resisted the threat of sexual blackmail could state a quid pro 
quo claim. We do not read Title VII to punish the victims of sexual harassment who 
surrender to unwelcome sexual encounters. Such a rule would only encourage harassers to 
increase their persistence."}. 
1116 The fear or discomfort that accompanies the threat is a concern. See Jansen v. 
Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1997} (Flaum, J., concurring} C'A 
supervisor's unambiguous communication that adverse job action is imminent if sexual favors 
are not forthcoming causes the employee real emotional strife."). 
181 Cf. Breeding v. Arthur Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999} \We 
conclude that the conditions of which Ms. Breeding complains, even if they make out a basis 
for a sexual harassment hostile environment claim, do not amount to sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of constructive discharge."}. 
138 See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994} (noting that even when 
facing harassment "[f]or economic reasons, most workers cannot simply abandon their 
employment-new jobs are hard to find"}. 
1119 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-54 (1998} (suggesting that old 
distinctions between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment are not as stark 
as has been suggested); see also White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 730 (suggesting that 
distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment should be dropped, with focus 
being on whether harassment has resulted in tangible job detriment}. 
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quid pro quo and hostile work environment discrimination based on 
the style of the supervisor's conduct, the Court focuses solely on the 
effect the conduct has on the employee's job. This focus suggests 
that quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment are 
essentially the same cause of action with slight variations, rather 
than fundamentally different causes of action. 
b. Atmospheric Harassment. In contrast to quid pro quo and 
pre-quid pro quo harassment, which often focus on specific incidents 
of harassment, atmospheric harassment focuses on the employee's 
overall working environment. An atmospheric hostile work 
environment claim may lie when a particular employee or group of 
employees is unwelcome, 140 welcome only under certain 
discriminatory conditions, treated as irrelevant or treated as sexual 
objects, or when their working environment is such that the 
employees labor under qualitatively different terms of employment 
because of gender.141 As the EEOC noted, and the Supreme Court 
echoed, "Title VII affords employees the right to work in an 
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult."142 When such intimidation, ridicule, or insult occurs because 
of sex and results in discriminatory terms of employment, the Title 
VII prohibition against sex discrimination is implicated. 
Atmospheric harassment can appear quite different from pre-
quid pro quo harassment because it can easily stem from gender 
hostility rather than sexual attraction, 143 and may not involve 
140 See Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 569 (noting that harassment can be 
concrete method of indicating that women are not welcome in particular workplace). 
141 See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that discriminatory 
atmosphere can alter terms, conditions or privileges of employment). 
141 Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing EEOC Guidelines); see 
also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (noting that Title VII does not tolerate 
workplaces that are "permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' "). 
143 Of course, the desire to treat women as sexual beings may stem from the same desire 
to drive them out of the workplace. Sometimes it is unclear which desire motivates specific 
harassing conduct. Fremling and Posner note: "When men want to drive women out of the 
workplace, they sometimes do so by flaunting symbols of male sexuality, as by using obscene 
language, exhibiting their genitalia, and posting pornographic photographs." Fremling & 
Posner, supra note 131, at 1085. Of course, sexual harassment may be designed generally to 
make women feel uncomfortable and incompetent in certain workplaces. See Schultz, supra 
note 11, at 1687 (noting that many forms of sexual harassment are meant "to undermine ... 
female colleagues' perceived (or sometimes even actual) competence to do the work~). 
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sexual advances. 144 Gender-motivated harassment from any source, 
including co-workers, subordinates, or customers, may support an 
atmospheric hostile work environment harassment claim. 145 Of 
course, the harassment must be severe or pervasive to be actionable. 
In the atmospheric harassment context, the severe or pervasive 
requirement makes sense because the severity or pervasiveness of 
the harassment is directly related to how different an employee's 
working conditions are from her male co-workers. The difference in 
working conditions constitutes the constructive alteration of the 
terms of employment. 
That a workplace is rife with sexual commentary, sexual 
innuendo, or sexual advances, however, does not render it sexually 
hostile for sexual harassment purposes.146 Rather, a hostile work 
environment is one in which the workplace atmosphere amounts to 
a discriminatory term of employment for a particular employee or 
group of employees because of their sex.147 Though a workplace 
atmosphere may be common to all employees (or may not be if a 
particular employee is targeted for harassment), the sexually hostile 
workplace imposes more difficult working conditions on the 
complaining employee than on other employees.148 Even if men and 
women co-exist in a sexually charged workplace, the nature of the 
144 At times, of course, it does. See generally Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 
F.2d 934, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that plaintiff was propositioned by several co-
workers and supervisors). 
146 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1l(e) (1999) (noting that employer may be deemed responsible for 
harassing acts of non-employees). 
146 Some commentators seem to disagree. See Kimball E. Gilmer & Jeffrey M. Anderson, 
Zero Tolerance For God?: Religious Expression in the Workplace After Ellerth and Faragher, 
42 How. L.J. 327 (1999) (arguing generally that Ellerth and Faragher express preference for 
zero tolerance). 
147 See MAcKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 209 (noting that sexual 
harassment can become condition of work because it effectively places additional burdens on 
women in workplace). 
148 The workplace described in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 
(M.D. Fla. 1991), was rife with atmospheric harassment and exemplified a hostile workplace. 
In Robinson, plaintiff Lois Robinson and her female co-workers were constantly exposed to 
language and conduct that indicated that a woman's primary function in life was to be a 
sexual partner and that a woman's primary function at the job site was to provide 
entertainment for male workers. Though most of the conduct amounted to comments and 
non-physical conduct, such as the posting of pictures, the actions were designed to keep the 
workplace a boy's club. See id. at 1493 (noting that one male employee referred to subject 
workplace as a boy's club). 
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harassment may affect employees of one gender differently than 
employees of the other gender. 149 Indeed, employees of the same 
gender may feel differently about the hostility of a particular 
workplace. 150 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 151 the Supreme Court 
described a workplace where comments and physical conduct were 
sufficiently offensive to yield a hostile work environment.152 In 
Faragher, the offensive conduct consisted of "repeatedly subjecting 
. . . female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching, . . . 
making lewd remarks, and . . . speaking of women in offensive 
terms."153 On one occasion, plaintiffBethAnn Faragher was tackled 
by one of her supervisors and told that "but for a physical 
characteristic [the supervisor] found unattractive, he would readily 
have had sexual relations with her."154 In addition, individual 
supervisors often made reference to wanting to have sex with 
particular subordinate female lifeguards, and generally discussed 
women's bodies around female lifeguards.1515 The trial court 
determined that the conduct was not merely annoying; it severely 
149 See Hebert, Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 574-75 (noting that sexualized 
workplace common to both sexes may harm women more than men). 
1110 Different people may experience discrimination differently. The same conduct can be 
welcome by some employees, but unwelcome to other employees of the same sex. See, e.g., 
Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 460 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that 
conduct that one female employee found flattering another female employee found harassing). 
151 524 u.s. 775 (1998). 
152 Egregious, but less severe, conduct can be actionable. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 7 42, 7 47-48 (1998) (describing conduct consisting of inappropriate sexual comments 
and suggestive carfssing); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (describing, as 
potentially actionable, conduct consisting largely of derogatory comments and incidents, 
including company president's request that female employees retrieve coins from his pants 
pocket). 
153 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 780. 
IM Id. at 782; se.~ also Abieta v. Transamerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 248-49 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (describing hostile work environment where comments consisted generally of desire 
to have sex with other women). 
1115 Many cases involving similar conduct exist. See, e.g., Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 
F.3d 923, 927 (5th Cir. 1999) (detailing conduct that included talk from employee's 
supervisors about employee's body, invitations to have sex, and other talk of sexual nature, 
but not including touchings); Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 
1260·61 (lOth Cir. 1998) (relating that supervisor made comments about female body parts 
in general and engaged in relatively minor touching of plaintiff); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 
104 F.3d 822, 826-27 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting comments made were disrespectful of women in 
general and indicated juvenile obsession with female body parts). 
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affected plaintiffs working conditions and work.156 Because the 
conduct was undertaken because of sex and resulted in 
discriminatory work conditions, the Supreme Court ratified the trial 
court's conclusion that the plaintiff had pled a hostile work 
environment. 157 
As should be clear from Faragher, workplace atmosphere is 
shaped by all workplace conduct. Thus, atmospheric harassment 
need not be directed invariably at a particular employee to support 
that employee's atmospheric harassment claim.158 In fact, one of the 
first cases dealing with a racial hostile work environment (a 
precursor to sexual hostile work environment) was brought by an 
employee who was aggrieved by conduct directed at customers of her 
race rather than at her.1159 While the term "harassment" may seem 
to require the intent to harass or at least an intent to affect a 
particular employee, the term may not always have that connotation 
in the context of hostile work environment discrimination. When 
conduct creates a hostile work environment, the motivation of those 
engaging in the harassing conduct may be irrelevant. 160 Rather 
uss See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 783 (finding conduct "alter[ed] the conditions of Faragher's 
employment and constitut[ed] an abusive working environment"). 
157 See id. at 786 (ruling in Faragher's favor). 
1158 See Black, 104 F.3d at 826 (mentioning that most comments, though generally 
offensive, were not directed at plaintiff); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415·16 
(lOth Cir. 1987) (noting that harassment not directed at plaintiff may be used to prove hostile 
work environment claim); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that 
harassment need not be directed at plaintiff to be cognizable); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 
238-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting generally that conduct need not be aimed specifically at 
employee to result in discriminatory hostile work environment with respect to employee); 
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (detailing 
activity not exclusively aimed at plaintiff). That many comments were not directed at 
plaintiff may affect the likelihood that an environment will be found to be objectively hostile. 
See Black, 104 F.3d at 826 ("[W]e note that in this case most of the comments were not 
directed at plaintiff; this fact contributes to our conclusion that the conduct here was not 
severe enough to create an objectively hostile environment."). 
159 Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234. While racial and sexual hostile work environment 
harassment can be analogized, comparing them can also be tricky. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
787 n.1 ("Although racial and sexual harassment will often take different forms, and 
standards may not be entirely interchangeable, we think there is good sense in seeking 
generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable harassment."); 
MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 127-41 (comparing approaches to sex 
discrimination and race discrimination); see also Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex, supra 
note 99 (suggesting that, due to differences between racial and sexual harassment, 
analogizing them can lead to improper characterization of both). 
160 Some commentators suggest that not only should intent be relevant, but comments 
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than focusing on a co-worker's intent, the issue is what effect the 
harassment had on the complaining employee's working 
conditions.161 If the result of the harassment is the discriminatory 
provision of terms of an employee's employment because of sex, an 
atmospheric harassment claim may lie.162 
A collection of small and large indignities may yield an 
environment in which the complaining employee may not thrive 
because of gender discrimination. 163 That comments combined with 
fairly minor physical contact164 or lewd and offensive remarks 
alone165 may be sufficient to create an actionable hostile work 
should not be actionable unless directed at the plaintiff. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, What 
Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997) 
(arguing that only targeted speech should be actionable as harassment). 
181 See Maatman, supra note 11, at 74-75 \A harasser's objections that no harm was 
meant are irrelevant in determining whether a hostile environment has been created: the 
Meritor and Harris standards focus nearly exclusively on the effect of the harasser's acts, and 
not on their intended purpose or motivation."). 
182 See Bundy, 6 U F .2d at 934; Rogers, 454 F.2d at234. The constructive alteration occurs 
if the employee endures conditions that employees of the opposite gender do not face or the 
employee endures conditions she would not have to face were she a man. 
183 See Abieta v. Transamerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that even relatively mild statements can create hostile work environment if"commonplace, 
ongoing, and continual"); Bundy, 641 F.2d at 934; Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234; Robinson, 760 F. 
Supp. at 1486; J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environment, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2295, 
2297 (1999) ("Even if individual acts do not constitute a hostile environment separately, they 
can be actionable when taken together.j. 
JM This reference is not meant to suggest that undesired touching is appropriate; rather 
it is meant to suggest that some kinds of unwanted physical contact in the workplace are far 
more offensive than others. Compare Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60-61 
(1986), and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780,782, with Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 
747-48 (1998), and Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1993). 
186 Many reported cases exist where no touching has occurred, but speech and conduct 
were sexual. E.g., Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1998); Smith v. 
Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1417 (lOth Cir. 1997) (noting that hostile 
work environment claim does not require physical conduct or touching); see also Cecilee Price-
Huish, "Because thE Constitution Demands It": Specific Speech Injunctive Relief for Title VII 
Hostile Work Environment Claims, 7 WM. &MARYBILLRTS. J. 193, 194-97 (1998) (suggesting 
that words alone can easily create hostile work environment). Indeed, same-sex harassment 
may generally invo1ve commentary rather than physical acts. See William E. Foote & Jane 
Goodman-Delahunty, Same-Sex Harassment: Implications of the Oncale Decision for Forensic 
Evaluation of Plaintiffs, 17 BEHA V. SCI. & L. 123, 130 (1999) \When same-sex harassment 
occurs among males, it is most often verbal in nature. Incidents involving put-downs, 
homosexual epithets, and similar statements occur ten times more often than incidents 
involving sexual touching or coercion."); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1700 (noting Carroll 
Brodsky's suggestion that sexual harassment can take form of"men teasing other men about 
sexual potency or interest"). Conversely, same-sex harassment can also involve physical 
harassment of the most offensive type. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
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environment has disturbed some commentators.166 However, that 
multiple minor indignities can create an actionable hostile work 
environment is consistent with the notion that atmospheric 
harassment relates more to overarching workplace conditions than 
isolated harassing acts. 167 Hostile work environment harassment is 
more about whether the employee feels disadvantaged each time she 
enters her workplace than about whether she is harassed 
episodically or periodically. Consequently, a hostile workplace can 
be created by incidents that might not be actionable if pled 
individually.168 
Whether a workplace drips with sexual hostility, sexual 
commentary, sexual desire, or some combination of all three, the 
critical inquiry is whether the individual employee's working 
conditions have been adversely affected. Related to that concern is 
whether the workplace atmosphere is one in which all employees 
can thrive, regardless of gender.169 That Title VII prohibits an 
523 U.S. 75 (1997) (recognizing same-sex harassment claim based on sexual harassment by 
heterosexual men); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 
1001 (1998). 
186 See Epstein, supra note 72, at 400 n.8 (citing articles criticizing harassment law on 
First Amendment grounds); Volokh, supra note 160, at 627 n.2 (noting articles discussing 
First Amendment concerns with restricting workplace speech even in context of hostile work 
environment discrimination). Commentators, however, have answered the attacks. See, e.g., 
Bernstein, supra note 54, at 517-19 (noting possible co-existence of respect demanded by 
sexual harassment law and First Amendment protections); Epstein, supra note 72, at 400 
("The implicit holding of the Bundy case-that speech alone can create a discriminatory 
hostile work environment-went unquestioned for many years."); Willborn, supra note 10, at 
719. 
167 See, e.g., Bundy, 641 F.2d at 940 (noting that essence of hostile work environment was 
propositioning and harassing that was "standard operating procedure" in workplace). 
188 In Draper, the court described plaintiffs work environment: 
Here, Draper has testified that she was subject to the same sort of 
harassment by Anelli on a regular basis, and that she constantly felt 
uncomfortable and upset at work. As in most claims of hostile work 
environment harassment, the discriminatory acts were not always 
of a nature that could be identified individually as significant events; 
instead, the day-to-day harassment was primarily significant, both 
as a legal and as a practical matter, in its cumulative effect. 
Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108; Balkin, supra note 163. Hostile work environment harassment can 
be less about driving women away from the workplace and more about keeping women "in 
their place" in the workplace. See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 9-23 
(noting generally that harassment is used to keep women in lower position in workplace); 
Franke, supra note 54, at 693 ("Sexual harassment is a technology of sexism."). 
168 See Epstein, supra note 72, at 405 (noting physical and psychological problems that can 
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employer from creating or tolerating an environment in which an 
employee or group of employees cannot be expected to thrive due to 
their gender is no surprise given Title VII's goal of the elimination 
of all discriminatory workplace barriers.170 
Atmospheric harassment is not just about an individual employee 
taking offense at poor treatment in the workplace.171 The hostile 
work environment must make it more difficult, either physically or 
emotionally, for the employee to do her job because of her gender.172 
In short, workplace conduct can effectively alter the conditions of an 
employee's employment even when the employer or supervisor does 
not explicitly change the terms of employment. Because the 
employer is generally responsible for the workplace atmosphere, it 
may be liable when that workplace becomes hostile when the 
employer knew or should have known about the harassing 
conduct. 173 
accompany sexual harassment). 
170 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Title VII prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of gender, and seeks to remove arbitrary barriers to 
sexual equality at the workplace ... .''); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1796 ("From the beginning, 
the central purpose of [Title VII's} ... prohibition against sex discrimination has been to 
enable everyone-regardless of their identities as men or women, or their personae as 
masculine or feminine-to pursue their chosen endeavors on equal, empowering terms."). 
171 Of course, actionable sexual harassment does cause offense. See Bernstein, supra note 
154, at 462 (noting that hostile work environment harassment is about "disturbance of inner 
equilibrium, a notion inherently connected to emotional turmoil"). 
172 This can be a problem even when the complaining employee is a supervisor or 
manager. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 11, at 1722-23 (describing case in which woman 
subforeman was harassed out of her job by subordinates who wanted male subforeman). 
Regardless of the employee involved, atmospheric harassment may lead to lower work 
performance which may, in turn, lead to the inability to share in tangible job benefits (such 
as promotion) or tc· an employee's resignation or termination. See id. at 1764 (noting that 
harassment may lead to poor performance that can seem to legitimize employee's failure to 
advance). Even though one need not allege that one's actual work production suffered in 
order to state a claim, atmospheric harassment creates conditions under which an employee 
may not thrive because of her gender. 
173 See White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 742 (detailing Supreme Court's standard 
for employer liability after Ellerth and Faragher). Given that supervisors act as the employer 
for workplace discipline, it seems an unusual workplace in which a responsible supervisor did 
not know that atmospheric sexual harassment was occurring. Of course, when the supervisor 
helps create the ho.itile work environment, charging the employer with vicarious knowledge 
of the hostile work environment may not make sense. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 810 (1998) (declining to determine propriety of court of appeals's refusal to find 
employer was vicariously knowledgeable about hostile work environment created by 
supervisors). But see Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999) (suggesting 
that where workplace is isolated from headquarters, employer may be liable for hostile work 
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Unfortunately, our hypothetical plaintiff Susan Jones probably 
does not have an actionable hostile work environment claim. AB 
noted earlier, it is unlikely that the conduct she was subjected to 
amounted to unwelcome harassment sufficient to support a sexual 
harassment claim.174 This is worrisome given that the harm that 
Susan Jones suffered was very similar to the harm suffered by 
plaintiffs pleading actionable hostile work environment claims. 
Based on the conduct involved, Susan believed that her 
opportunities would likely be limited by the gender-motivated 
conduct of those around her. Her choice was similar to that faced by 
Kimberly Ellerth: acquiesce or quit.175 
Any emotional stress Susan Jones suffered as a result of her 
treatment would likely be sufficient to sustain a hostile work 
environment claim were she able to plead such a claim.176 Because 
neither actual job detriment nor severe psychological harm is 
required for hostile work environment liability, Susan's legitimate 
fear of being denied job benefits would be sufficient to yield an 
environment harassment engaged in by supervisors even where commanders at headquarters 
were unaware of supervisors' harassment). Of course, a supervisor may know that gender-
motivated activity is occurring, without recognizing the conduct as harassment. In that case, 
the inquiry should shift to whether the supervisor should have known that the conduct 
amounted to harassment. 
174 See supra Part III. 
115 Had the conduct involved been harassing, Susan Jones surely would be able to state 
an actionable hostile work environment claim. For instance, had Susan been told repeatedly 
that she would not become a partner at PW unless she slept with a partner, she would surely 
be able to state a hostile work environment claim. Susan would arguably be in precisely the 
position Ellerth was, believing that she has to quit or become more sexually accessible. 
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747-49 (1998). In such an instance, Susan would 
have suffered the same type, if not amount, of damage as in the hypothetical. 
Precisely what kind of conduct is actionable is somewhat unclear. Some student 
commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court has not demarcated any lines; it is not 
clear what type of conduct falls short of actionable harassment under Title Vll. See, e.g., John 
Davidson Miller III, Note, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Actionable Under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Is This the End of Horseplay as We Know It?, 29 SETON HALLL. REv. 
787, 811 (1998) (suggesting difficulty in distinguishing when "ordinary socializing" becomes 
offensive socializing that creates hostile work environment); Wendy M. Parr, Case note, When 
Does Male-on-Male Horseplay Become Discrimination Because of Sex?: Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Incorporated, 25 Omo N.U. L. REV. 87 (1999) (suggesting Oncale decision 
did not clarify when horseplay stops and hostile work environment begins). 
176 See Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1413 (lOth Cir. 1997) 
(instructing that to state hostile work environment claim "[i]t is sufficient that Plaintiffs 
testimony reflects that [supervisor's] comments were intolerable, publicly made, and caused 
humiliation and a loss of self-respect"). 
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actionable claim.177 Susan's fear was reasonable if the comments 
from PW's partners and employees reflected the reality of PW's 
partnership selection process.178 Her damages would simply depend 
on the stress she faced. 179 
C. REALIGNING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
The Supreme Court's recent sexual harassment rulings have 
realigned the e.exual harassment causes of action. The Court's focus 
on the necessity of actual job detriment to support quid pro quo 
harassment has produced three varieties ofharassmentclaims, quid 
pro quo, pre-quid pro quo, and hostile work environment. Pre-quid 
pro quo harassment and atmospheric hostile work environment 
combine to define hostile work enVironment harassment as 
actionable sexual harassment that does not yield actual job 
detriment. This realignment helps focus the Court's position 
regarding quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment. 
Before the realignment, quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment harassment were fundamentally different causes of 
action, though some conduct could support either.180 Quid pro quo 
harassment focused on the concrete terms of an employee's 
relationship with the employer; hostile work environment focused 
on an employee's relationship to the workplace. That an employer 
or supervisor had determined that concrete job terms would depend 
on its employee's willingness to have sex was the essence of a quid 
pro quo claim. Conversely, that supervisors, co-workers, and others 
continually pestered an employee for sex, treated her like a sexual 
177 Severe emotional stress is not required. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., tHO U.S. 17, 
24 (1993) (stating that "conduct need not severely affect [the employee's] pyschological well· 
being"); Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (lOth Cir. 1998) 
C'While the plaintiff must make a showing that the environment was both objectively and 
subjectively hostile, she need not demonstrate psychological harm, nor is she required to show 
that her work suffured as a result of the harassment."). 
178 Prior PW employment decisions might be sufficient to create the stress that supports 
a hostile work environment claim (Le., the fear that non-conformity might lead to a negative 
employment decision). 
179 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 253 (1994) (holding that Title VII 
plaintiff may recover damages for emotional harm). 
1110 See Meritor Save. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (allowing sexual advances to 
support hostile work environment claim). 
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object, or simply made it more difficult for her to do her job because 
she was a woman was the essence of a hostile work environment 
claim. Today, because quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
harassment are distinguished merely by the existence or non-
existence of actual job detriment, they are essentially the same 
cause of action with a marginally meaningful distinction. 181 As we 
see in the next Part, that redefinition has serious implications for 
the future of sexual harassment law. 
V. DISPARATE TREATMENT AND SEXUAL HARAsSMENT 
A. REAIJGNING DISPARATE TREATMENT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Although both disparate treatment discrimination and sexual 
harassment constitute sex discrimination, they have been treated as 
distinct forms of sex discrimination.182 Disparate treatment 
discrimination generally describes an employment decision made 
because of an employee's sex;183 sexual harassment generally 
describes unwelcome gender-motivated harassment that culminates 
in the discriminatory provision of terms of employment.184 The 
Supreme Court's recent elimination of the doctrinal distinction 
between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment 
coupled with its expansion of the type of conduct that can support 
a sexual harassment claim has eliminated much of the distinction 
between disparate treatment discrimination and quid pro quo 
sexual harassment. 185 Sexual harassment now includes any gender-
181 See Gilmer & Anderson, supra note 146, at 338 (suggesting that because the Court has 
eliminated distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment there 
may be more sexual harassment lawsuits in future). 
182 See Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(differentiating sex discrimination and sexual harassment); Holtz v. Marcus Theatres, 31 F. 
Supp. 2d 1139 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (treating sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims 
as requiring different forms of proof). That disparate treatment and sexual harassment are 
subsumed by Title VII means that some similarity exists between them. This similarity, 
however, need not mean that they are very similar. 
183 See supra Part IT. 
ta.c Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serve., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
188 See generally White, Nothing Special, supra note 2, at 725 (discussing treating 
disparate treatment and sexual harassmeni; similarly); Willborn, supra note 10, at 677 
2000] SEX DISCRIMINATION 1635 
motivated harassment that can support an inference of 
discrimination.186 Thus, disparate treatment discrimination consists 
of gender-based conduct, treatment, or decisions resulting in actual 
job detriment;187 quid pro quo sexual harassment consists of gender-
based harassment that results in actual job detriment. Quid pro 
quo sexual harassment is merely a subset of disparate treatment 
discrimination where the conduct charged constitutes harassment. 
While some may argue that quid pro quo harassment has always 
been a subset of disparate treatment discrimination, there was in 
fact a real distinction between the type of conduct that supported a 
sexual harassment claim and the type of conduct that supported a 
disparate treatment claim. At the very least, the distinction was 
sufficient to substantially delay the recognition of required sexual 
harassment claims as unquestionably actionable, unlike disparate 
treatment discrimination claims.188 Rather than being considered 
sex discrimination, sexual harassment was viewed by some courts 
as merely harassment based on physical attraction.189 
The assimilation of quid pro quo harassment into disparate 
treatment discrimination seemingly leaves the hostile work 
environment .3exual harassment claim as a misfit piece of the Title 
(suggesting doctrinal links between sexual harassment and sex discrimination). 
1116 Any gender-motivated conduct that can be viewed as harassment may be actionable 
as sexual harassment. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (noting that "harassing conduct need not 
be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex"); 
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 1999) ('The single question that 
we need to answer after Oncale is a straightforward one: Can one reasonably infer from the 
evidence before us that the harassment Shepherd describes was discrimination 'because of 
his sex?"). 
187 Some courts require tangible job detriment for a disparate treatment claim. See, e.g., 
Breeding, 164 F.3d at 1157 ('We conclude that Ms. Breeding has not presented a submissible 
case of either direct or indirect evidence of either age or sex discrimination against her, 
because she has n•Jt demonstrated that she suffered any adverse employment action."); see 
also White, De Minimis Discrimination, supra note 13. 
188 See Franke supra note 54, at 698 ('After a period of unsuccessful litigation in which 
sexual harassment claims were dismissed ... , feminist advocates provoked a paradigm shift 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s in which the sexism in sexual harassment was recognized 
in the law."); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1701 ('Women lost some of the first Title VII cases 
challenging harassment."); Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The "Unwelcome" 
Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1558, 1563 (1992) ('It was 
thirteen years before a court finally used Title VII to remedy sexual harassment."). 
189 See MACKINNON, WORKING WOMEN, supra note 39, at 59 (detailing early sexual 
harassment cases); Schultz, supra note 11, at 1701 (noting that during Title VII's formative 
years, some courts did not consider sexual harassment to be sex discrimination). 
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VII puzzle. It is not. The hostile work environment harassment 
claim's position actually clarifies the legal theory supporting Title 
VII. Hostile work environment harassment consists of gender-based 
harassment that causes a change in the terms of an employee's 
employment but does not result in actual job detriment. Symmetry 
would require that there be a disparate treatment analog to hostile 
work environment sexual harassment, a hostile work environment 
disparate treatment claim consisting of gender-based conduct, 
treatment, or decisions that cause a change in the terms of an 
employee's employment without resulting in actual job detriment. 
The Susan Jones hypothetical purposely illustrates this point. 
In a nutshell, Susan Jones was told by partners and employees 
at PW that she needed to conform to an antiquated view of a woman 
in order to become a partner. Upset at her treatment, unwilling to 
alter her behavior, and fearing that a negative partnership vote 
would adversely affect her career, Susan Jones left PW to join 
another accounting firm. The conduct Susan encountered at PW 
indicated that she was to be held to a different standard than male 
accountants; her partnership was contingent on gender-influenced 
criteria not related to her job. The conduct also created working 
conditions that were more difficult for Susan Jones because of her 
sex. Not only was she concerned about whether her candidacy 
would be judged the same way as a male partner candidate's would, 
she also was told repeatedly that PW valued her as a particular type 
of woman rather than merely as an accountant. The conduct Susan 
endured was gender-motivated sex stereotyping similar to the 
conduct in Price Waterhouse, 190 and would support a disparate 
treatment claim had actual job detriment occurred. 
190 See supra notes 30·37 and accompanying text (discussing Price Waterhouse case). Had 
Susan been declined a partnership, her treatment would support a disparate treatment claim 
if the gender-motivated sexual stereotyping by PW's partners directly informed the decision 
to decline her partnership. Susan's case could also be treated as a quid pro quo sexual 
harassment case. Her partnership was held because she refused to model herself as a 
stereotypical woman partner. A quid pro quo case requires gender-motivated harassment 
resulting in a tangible job detriment. Susan suffered a tangible job detriment after declining 
to change her appearance or behavior. If the PW partners' acknowledged requirement that 
Susan acquiescence to a gender-based vision of a woman partner to gain a partnership can 
be fairly considered sexual harassment, her case might state a quid pro quo harassment case. 
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
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The remaining issue is whether the offending conduct led to the 
discriminatory provision of terms of employment because of sex in 
the same way that sexual harassment results in discrimination in 
a hostile work environment case. The conduct described in the 
hypothetical would likely have the same effect that harassment 
would.191 Susan Jones was told by PW's partners and her co-
workers that, in order to become a partner, she needed to change 
her behavior to conform to the partnership's gender-influenced 
vision of a woman partner.192 Even if the statements from her co-
workers did not indicate that Susan needed to change her behavior, 
the statements from PW's partners clearly did. Being told by 
partners who will vote on one's partnership that behavior 
modification should occur suggests that the partnership requires 
modification. Whether the statements indicating that Susan should 
change her behavior came in the form of friendly advice from those 
191 Indeed, the conduct to which Susan was subjected could, in theory, constitute sexual 
harassment. Since Price Waterhouse tells us that sex stereotyping is conduct motivated by 
sex, the conduct dlrected at Susan was "sexual" for sexual harassment purposes. The 
remaining question is whether the conduct was harassing. It may be, as the intent of the 
conduct was to have Susan alter her behavior for gender-motivated reasons. 
The conduct Susan endured was arguably unwelcome. Unwelcomeness is usually 
defined in the conte:rt of sexually offensive conduct or sexual advances, and in such situations 
can be easy to identify. Conduct is unwelcome or not welcome because plaintiffs wish the 
conduct would stop or wish it had never occurred. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 
F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) C'In order to constitute harassment, this conduct must be 
unwelcome in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the 
employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."). Being told to change one's 
appearance and personality is unwelcome, as is being told that women are to be judged by 
personal characteristics unrelated to accounting. This is particularly true when the 
comments come from partners who might have the power to control or influence whether 
employees become partners. Conversely, Susan may welcome the comments if she has no 
problem conforming to PW's stereotypical vision of a woman partner and views the comments 
as helpful hints, even while she does not welcome the underlying method of choosing 
partners. However, if Susan does not want to conform, being told that one will be judged on 
how well one fits a stereotypical ideal is not welcome. The partners' conduct could be viewed 
as unwelcome because it is arguably part of the official message from the partnership about 
the decisionmaking process. For the same reason, the partners' conduct could be 
harassment-it seeks an involuntary change of behavior. While an argument can be made 
that the conduct at PW was harassment, it looks much more like non-harassing 
discriminatory conduct. 
192 This advice IS similar to that which the partner at Price Waterhouse gave Hopkins 
after her partnership vote. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) 
(recalling that Hopkins was told that "in order to improve her chances for partnership •.. 
[she] should 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry'"). 
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who wanted her to become a partner or in the form of threatening 
commands from those who believed she would resist change, the 
statements indicated to Susan that she must change in order to 
advance professionally.193 To the extent that she faced the same 
type of harm, including fear and emotional distress, that a victim of 
a hostile work environment sexual harassment may face, 194 Susan 
Jones should be able to recover for that harm. 
Susan Jones endured conduct that would be sufficient to support 
both a disparate treatment and a hostile work environment sexual 
harassment claim. Any concerns that a hostile work environment 
disparate treatment claim would inappropriately link disparate 
treatment conduct to sexual harassment harm is misplaced. As 
explained above, the Supreme Court implicitly resolved this concern 
by leveling distinctions between disparate treatment discrimination 
and sexual harassment through its realignment of disparate 
treatment, quid pro quo, and hostile work environment sexual 
harassment claims. Susan Jones should be able to state a sex 
discrimination claim of some sort. 
Susan should be able to recover based on discriminatory conduct 
that has yet to cause actual job detriment. In some circumstances, 
Title VII provides recovery for conduct that occurs even before a 
plaintiff has taken a job. 195 Presumably, had Susan been told that 
she would need to promise to act femininely or she would not be 
hired, the job offer woqld be actionable under Title VII. 196 In 
addition, Susan could also recover for sex stereotyping that affected 
an actual partnership decision.197 
193 Encouraging unwanted behavior modification is often the essence ofharassment. The 
desire to prevent employers from forcing employees to change their behavior in order to 
procure job benefits is arguably at the heart of anti-discrimination statutes. See MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 34, at 104 (arguing that laws against sexual harassment 
are call for self-determination). This does not necessarily suggest that the conduct Susan 
endured was harassment, just that it had the same impact as harassment. 
194 See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (discussing emotional distress in 
hostile work environment claims). 
1911 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1999) (stating that discriminatory failures to hire are 
covered by Title VII). 
196 In the civil rights/employment context, discriminatory offers can form the basis of a 
suit. E.g., Sharkey v. Lasmo, 992 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Currie v. Danna, No. 92 C 
8021, 1994 WL 494708 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1994). 
197 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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Susan Jones's hostile work environment disparate treatment 
claim is simply a middle ground between the discriminatory offer 
and the denied partnership. If she can prove that comments from 
the partners about the partnership decision indicated that her terms 
of employment were different from or more onerous than those of 
her male colleagues and that the comments created or reflected an 
atmosphere that made it more difficult for her to thrive 
professionally, she should be able to recover. Little reason exists to 
immunize from liability statements and actions that reflect the 
reality that an employment decision will be based on discriminatory 
attitudes. 
The harm that Susan Jones suffered is a hostile work 
environment harm. Consequently, she should be able to recover the 
same type of damages that any hostile work environment plaintiff 
could recover. Whether Susan's damages are few or substantial, she 
should be able to state a Title VII claim. 198 Title VII does not 
generally excuse proven discrimination from liability based on 
seriousness.199 Rather than being immunized, relatively 
insubstantial discrimination should yield small damages. 200 
That PW should be deemed responsible for Susan's injury cannot 
be seriously challenged. Rather than making certain that Susan 
had every reason to believe she would be treated fairly regardless of 
her gender, PW's partners condoned and encouraged sex 
stereotyping. Consequently, PW is responsible for Susan's 
predicament, and Title VII should be available to remedy the 
situation even before Susan's partnership decision is made. PW's 
actual responsibility supports liability. 201 While sexual harassment 
198 See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that inconsequential 
effect of discrimination relates to amount of damages, not to existence ofliability); White, De 
Minimis Discrimirultion, supra note 13, at 1141 (suggesting that even inconsequential 
discrimination should result in liability and small damages rather than finding of no liability). 
198 See generally White, De Minimis Discrimination, supra note 13. 
200 See id. at 1163·64 ("In cases where the worker is motivated to sue over discrimination, 
however, any 'de minimis' nature of the discrimination may be addressed at the remedial 
stage. It should not be addressed by reading such discrimination out of the statute."). 
201 Though many suggest that sexual harassment is based on vicarious liability, sexual 
harassment law is actually based on employer responsibility. For example, when a supervisor 
acts as the employer, he becomes the employer for purposes of the action undertaken. See 
Faragherv. CityofBocaRaton, 1524 U.S. 775, 790·91 (1998)(citingnumerouscasestosupport 
employer liability). Vicarious liability exists when an employer is deemed responsible for 
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liability may be vicarious, it is not merely assigned liability. Title 
VII liability describes liability for which the employer is actually 
responsible, rather than merely liability for which the employer 
must compensate. 202 
Were Susan not allowed to bring a hostile work environment 
disparate treatment claim, she would have four options. First, 
Susan might attempt to shoehorn her case into a traditional hostile 
work environment framework. She would have to rely on an 
extremely sympathetic court with an expansive definition of 
harassment. Second, Susan could hope to make partner, risking 
failure because of PW's sex stereotyping, all the while suffering 
emotional damage that could affect her work sufficiently to make 
her a questionable candidate on the merits. She would have to wait 
for a negative employment decision, then sue. 208 At that point, she 
would be able to state a disparate treatment claim.204 Third, Susan 
might quit, preferring not to risk a negative decision that she would 
something arguably out ofits controL That is generally not the case with sexual harassment. 
Supervisors act as the employer for many purposes. The employer is not merely deemed 
responsible for the workplace, the employer, through the supervisor, is responsible for the 
workplace. Consequently, what occurs in the workplace with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment generally is the employer's responsibility. Most 
employers are able to control conduct if they put forth serious effort. See Estelle D. Franklin, 
Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers' Paradox in Responding to Hostile 
Environment Sexual Harassment-A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1517, 1591·93 
(1999) (suggesting that employers add bright·line rules to employment contracts allowing 
employer to punish gender· motivated conduct short of sexual harassment). 
202 Title Vll bases liability on unlawful employer practices: "It shall be an unlawful 
employer practice for an employer-to .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1999). Consequently, 
if the employer is actually not responsible for the discriminatory terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, no liability should exist under Title Vll; the conduct should not be 
considered an unlawful employer practice. Since the employer, however, is generally 
responsible for the workplace, it should be responsible for what occurs there except in a 
narrow set of circumstances. Nonetheless, some call for a negligence standard in sexual 
harassment cases. See, e.g., Stephen Kent Madsen, Note, Placing the Blame Where it Does 
Not Belong: Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 311 (1999) (arguing for 
negligence standard in harassment cases). 
203 This is a problem for two reasons. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989) (indicating plaintiff need not conform to sexual stereotypes); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 
F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (indicating that conditions of employment change well before 
tangible job detriment occurs and that employee need not wait for tangible job detriment to 
sue). 
20( However, since Title Vll's goal is to eliminate sex-influenced decisionmaking in 
employment, rather than merely to provide a suit when such a decision occurs, that option 
is not particularly palatable. 
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have to challenge later or explain to a future employer. Presumably 
she would not be able to sue successfully unless she alleged a 
constructive discharge, a difficult path considering how stringent 
the standards are for such cases.205 Fourth, Susan might alter her 
behavior to conform to that of PW's stereotypical female partner. 
This is what many of the PW partners and some of Susan's co-
workers want but is not what Susan wants. 
Susan Jones should not be limited by or to these options; she has 
suffered employment harm as a result of gender-based conduct. 
Thus, it should not be difficult for Susan to recover if she can prove 
the facts of her case. When an employee is harmed for refusing to 
conform to sexual stereotypes, she can recover under Title VII. The 
employee should be able to do so even before the conduct causes an 
actual job detriment. 
B. SIMPLIFYING TITLE Vll 
The addition of a hostile environment disparate treatment claim 
would complete the realignnient and simplification of sex 
discrimination that the Supreme Court has begun. When disparate 
treatment discrimination, quid pro quo harassment, and hostile 
work environment harassment were conceptually distinct, it 
arguably made sense to limit disparate treatment claims to those 
resulting in actual job detriment. Disparate treatment focused on 
employment decisions; given its focus on conduct of a sexual nature, 
sexual harassment seemed to cause the alteration of terms of 
employment in a very specific way. This no longer describes sex 
discrimination jurisprudence. 
Today, the Supreme Court seems to be asking two questions 
regarding any particular course of conduct: (1) Was the conduct 
gender-motivated?; (2) Were the employee's terms of employment 
discriminatorily offered or explicitly or constructively altered as a 
result of the conduct?206 If the answer to both questions is yes, 
205 See James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 992 (lOth Cir. 1994) ('A finding of 
constructive discharge must not be based only on the discriminatory act; there must also be 
aggravating factors that make staying on the job intolerable."); see also cases cited supra note 
89. 
205 See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1799 \[A] simplified cause of action should require only 
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liability should lie in all instances. The results of such a vision 
would be simple. Gender-motivated conduct resulting in tangible 
job detriment would be analyzed as quid pro quo harassment or 
disparate treatment discrimination.207 Gender-motivated conduct 
not yielding tangible job detriment would be treated as hostile work 
environment harassment or hostile work environment disparate 
treatment discrimination. This simplification would result in a 
more streamlined vision of disparate treatment discrimination, a 
vision that the Court seems to desire. 
The stage was set for this realignment a long time ago. In Rogers 
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,208 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that an Hispanic 
employee pleaded an unlawful employment practice based, in part, 
on her employer's segregation of Hispanic patients because such 
segregation could cause psychological and emotional damage. 209 Put 
differently, the court ruled that non-harassing discrimination could 
create an actionable racially hostile work environment. The time 
has come for the Supreme Court to ratify this vision in the sex 
discrimination area. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Disparate treatment, quid pro quo, and hostile work environment 
were once distinct causes of action that shared some resemblance. 
The Supreme Court's recent simplification and realignment of these 
causes of action, however, suggest that they are merely slight 
variations on the same theme. The Court's simplified reading of 
three elements: (1) Causation-Did the challenged conduct occur because of sex (or gender)? 
(2) Harm-Was the conduct sufficiently harmful to 'alter the conditions of ... employment 
and create an abusive working environment'? (3) Employer Responsibility-Was it conduct 
for which the employer is legally responsible?''); Willborn, supra note 10, at 696 ("In 
summary, a discrimination-centered model of sexual haraSBment would focus on the two 
elements required in every Title VII cause of action: discrimination and an effect on a term 
or condition of employment."). 
'JJY1 Some courts have already treated disparate treatment discrimination and sexual 
harassment prima facie cases similarly. See Stilley v. University of Pittsburgh, 968 F. Supp. 
252 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (treating sexual harassment prima facie case just like disparate 
treatment prima facie case). 
208 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
209 Id. at 240. 
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Title VII suggests that gender-motivated conduct that causes the 
constructive or explicit discriminatory provision of terms of 
employment may yield Title VII liability whenever an employer 
knows or should have known about the conduct. This vision of Title 
VII demands the creation of a hostile work environment disparate 
treatment cause of action encompassing gender-motivated conduct 
that constructively alters an employee's terms of employment. It 
also suggests quite sensibly that nearly any gender-related conduct 
in the workplace that substantially negatively affects an employee's 
work is potentially actionable. 210 While a hostile work environment 
disparate treatment cause of action could open the floodgates to 
additional Title VII litigation, it is nevertheless the logical extension 
of the Supreme Court's recent rulings. Having begun to simplify 
sexual harassment and sex discrimination, the Supreme Court 
should complete the task and face the implications of its actions.211 
210 This is not particularly problematic; given Title VITa goal of ridding the workplace of 
di!crimination, suggesting that Title Vll provide a remedy for all workplace discrimination 
is not at all radical_ See Maatman, supra note 11, at 81 C'What is needed, then, is a vision of 
what constitutes discrimination and its resulting injuries, so courts could consistently 
scrutinize employer conduct and employee injuries to determine if interests protected by 
antidiscrimination laws have been invaded.''). 
211 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (indicating that harm to 
employee's job performance is sufficient for Title Vll recovery); Meritor Savs. v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (noting that Title Vll does not require tangible job detriment for recovery). 
The harm involved need not cause severe psychological or emotional distress. See Harris, 510 
U.S. at 21-22 (ruling that neither severe psychological injury or actual injury is necessary for 
recovery). But see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) 
(suggesting that de minimis discrimination is not actionable). 

